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MANDATES, MARKETS, AND RISK:
AUTO INSURANCE AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS*
Now that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) individual health
insurance mandate has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, it
is an opportune time to examine precedents for the individual mandate that
were not considered in the legislative debate or litigation about the ACA's
constitutionality, particularly auto insurance mandates. Although
opponents' arguments were cast largely as Commerce Clause claims, the
arguments have a deeper foundation as claims about liberty and coercion
which go far beyond the Commerce Clause. Although auto insurance
mandates are obviously different, particularly in that they are state rather
than federal, auto insurance mandates can help us understand what
Congress was doing, and why, when it enacted the ACA reforms and the
individual mandate. Auto insurance mandates are relevant because they
are a ubiquitous example of risk-spreading through a combination of
private markets and public regulation, which is the same broad approach
taken by the ACA individual mandate. This article shows that auto
insurance mandates are an important precedent for the A CA individual
mandate, and have four significant parallels with the A CA provision. First,
both arose from challenging situations where there are compelling reasons
for mandates. Second, both types of mandate order that people insure
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themselves against risks they might want to bear themselves. Both types
require that risks be transferred and spread, which is an essential aspect of
what insurance does. Last, both require people to buy something from a
private seller. Both mandates are similar policy responses to important
public policy dilemmas involving physical harm or illness and how to
finance needed redress or treatment.
The article turns to the common rejoinder that auto insurance
mandates are fundamentally different because driving is a choice and so
regulation is acceptable, in contrast to the ACA mandate which regulates
living itself not an acceptable thing for government to do. This argument
is specious for at least three reasons. First, driving is not always a choice.
Second, the Supreme Court's decision shows that the ACA mandate
actually does create a choice. Third, auto insurance mandates actually are
far more coercive than the ACA individual mandate.
Finally, the article unearths and highlights pertinent aspects of the
history of auto insurance mandates. Opponents fought mandates for six
decades using arguments about freedom and American values to oppose
them, much as ACA mandate opponents do today. Doubts about and
challenges to the constitutionality of mandates were consistently resolved
in their favor particularly in light of the public welfare aspects of
insurance. "Freedom " arguments have faded over time and auto insurance
mandates have proven themselves a workable, widely accepted, very
American way of dealing with risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, all of
the justices of the United States Supreme Court viewed the Affordable
Care Act's (ACA's) individual health insurance mandate as legislation
aimed to influence individual conduct. The justices disagreed on the legal
implications of that conclusion. Justice Roberts' majority opinion treated
the mandate as a constitutionally permissible tax on the decision to not buy
health insurance but not as permissible under the commerce power.2 Justice
Ginsburg's opinion would have found the mandate constitutional under
'Nat. Fed'n. of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
'Id. at 2576-601.
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either power, and the four dissenting justices would have rejected the
mandate's constitutionality.4 But despite these disagreements, all of the
justices seem to agree that the mandate's focus on individual regulation is
central to the case. In their opinions and in their questions at oral argument,
some of the justices seemed to suggest that by taking this step toward
regulating individual behavior, Congress was doing something new, legally
questionable and perhaps even dangerous.5
The ACA and the mandate are likely to be with us for some time.
And there may well be other circumstances in which Congress or state
legislatures might consider adopting similar individual mandates.
Consequently, now is an opportune time to examine important precedents
for the individual mandate that were largely overlooked in the debate about
its constitutionality.6 Of these precedents, none is more important than auto
insurance mandates, as this Article shows.
Auto insurance mandates are obviously different in some ways
from the health insurance mandate. Importantly, they are creations of state
law, and Commerce Clause issues therefore do not arise.7 Nevertheless,
they are still absolutely relevant. Underlying the constitutional challenge
was the idea that the ACA's requirement that someone buy health
insurance, regardless of the reason for the requirement, was a frightening,
Id. at 2609-42.
4 Id. at 2642-77.
s Some of the questions at oral arguments over potential types of mandates,
such as being compelled to join an exercise club, Transcript of Oral Argument at
40, NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-393), to buy broccoli, id. at
13, or to buy burial insurance, id. at 7, are examples. Justice Alito's questions
seemed to indicate deep skepticism about the basic risk-sharing characteristics of
insurance and the mandate, id. at 7-8. Justice Scalia wrote, "[i]f Congress can
reach out and command even those furthest removed from an interstate market to
participate in the market, then the Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited
power." See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646.
6 Indeed, since the Supreme Court's decision, the issue of auto insurance
mandates as precedents has resurfaced, with Representative Michelle Bachmann
claiming on CNN that auto insurance mandates are totally different from the
ACA's individual mandate. Piers Morgan Tonight, Clips From Last Night:




Justice Roberts stated, "[a]ny police power to regulate individuals as such, as
opposed to their activities, remains vested in the States." NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
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unjustifiable, and unprecedented intrusion on personal liberty. Although
this argument was not explicitly made, it was an essential backdrop to the
litigation in general and to the Commerce Clause argument in particular.9
This focus of mandate opponents on ideas of liberty and coercion, with a
visceral opposition to government mandates, is likely to endure despite the
ACA mandate's having been upheld. The vehicle for the liberty and
coercion arguments in Sibelius was the Commerce Clause, and in the
future another constitutional provision may be pressed into service to make
similar or even broader arguments.o Our experience with auto insurance
mandates should help us evaluate whether these arguments have merit.
At a more basic level, understanding the role of individual
mandates in automobile insurance can help us understand what Congress
8 As Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Marcus noted in his dissent in
Florida v. Dept. of Health and Human Serv's., "implicit in the plaintiffs'
Commerce Clause challenge... is the deeply rooted fear that the federal
government is infringing upon the individual's right to be let alone-a fear that is
intertwined with a visceral aversion to the government's making us do something
we do not want to do." Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. ofHealth & Human
Serv's., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) affd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2566. See also, William P.
Marshall, National Healthcare and American Constitutional Culture, 35 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 144-47 (2012) (noting particularly American distrust of
government). Charles Fried blogged shortly after the Sibelius decision: "the
energy behind the broccoli argument was about personal liberty, and no litigant
ventured that the mandate violated the liberty clause of the Fifth Amendment."
Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and the Fog of War,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/
the-june-surprises-balls-strikes-and-the-fog-of-war/. For an explanation of the
"broccoli argument," see infra note 23.
9 See supra note 5. See also, e.g., Fried, supra note 8.
10 Charles Fried wrote in his blog post shortly after the decision: "Of course,
the real shadow of impropriety on everyone's mind but studiously omitted from
the argument and justifications is the supposed intrusion on individual liberty
implicated in Congress's scheme: the offense to liberty in requiring someone to
enter the market and buy something from a nongovernmental purveyor... But the
argument was not made because it would have had to be made under the Liberty
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and this would have carried over to the similar
clause in the Fourteenth and therefore rendered any such a scheme enacted by a
state, such as Massachusetts, similarly invalid." See Fried, supra note 8.
Massachusetts and New Jersey passed individual health insurance mandates before
the ACA was passed. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111 M § 2 (West 2006) and
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:15-2 (West 2009). The constitutionality of these mandates
has not been challenged to date.
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was doing, and why, when it enacted the individual mandate. Auto
insurance mandates are a ubiquitous example of risk-sharing through a
combination of private markets and public regulation, which is the same
broad approach taken by the ACA individual mandate." They also are an
important example, like the ACA individual mandate, of using private
insurance to tackle complex and wide-ranging problems involving illness
and injury which have significant public dimensions. While our society
uses private insurance to respond to many economic challenges, insurance
and insurance principles are often ignored or not understood by the public,
whether the subject is health, auto, or other insurance.12 That common lack
of understanding in turn creates fertile grounds for sweeping arguments
about individual liberty-arguments that nearly overturned the ACA and
that might well gain even greater traction in future debates. It is an ideal
time to examine what auto insurance mandates can tell us about the ACA
individual insurance mandate and about insurance mandates more
generally. These questions are largely unexamined in academic literature
and political discourse, perhaps because the ACA's advocates and
" See infra Part II.
12 According to one study by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC), nearly 60 percent of Americans feel confident about
making insurance decisions concerning auto, home, and life insurance, but after
taking a 10 question "insurance IQ test" the majority of responders to the survey
received a failing score of 40 percent. Americans Believe They're Savvy About
Insurance, But NAIC Insurance IQ Tells Different Story, NAT'L Ass'N OF INS.
COMM'RS (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.naic.org/Releases/2009_docs/insurance_
iq.htm. The NAIC also conducted a survey of 1,000 Americans concerning their
awareness of car insurance which revealed that "some of the basics of auto
insurance are not well understood, even though it is one of the most commonly
purchased types of insurance by people of all ages and demographics." New NAIC
Insurance IQ Study Reveals Americans Lacking in Confidence, Knowledge of
Insurance Choice, NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS (Apr. 6, 2010),
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2010_docs/iiq_new.htm. This same survey also
found that "86 percent of respondents said they do not understand all of the terms
being used in the current discussion on health care reform." Id. The Arizona
Department of Transportation released a report in 2004 regarding trends in
insurance coverage which notes that "many people do not understand the
difference between liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage." Lisa
Markkula, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists: Trends in Policy and
Enforcement, ARIZ. DEP'T OF TRANSP., (June 2004), http://www.azdot.gov/tpd/
atrc/publications/project-reports/pdf/az548.pdf.
2013 279
CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 19.2
defenders did not emphasize them, 13 and perhaps because insurance
principles are not widely understood.14 That absence of examination leaves
a significant gap in the literature which this Article endeavors to fill.
13 Auto insurance mandates were rarely mentioned in the litigation concerning
the ACA or in the legislative discussions of it. In its opening brief, the federal
government defended the health care individual mandate in part by referring to
state auto insurance mandates, but did not develop the argument. It wrote that:
"States have mandated insurance when (as here) an individual's lack of insurance
shifts risk to others." See 1 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 1:50
(rev. ed. 2009) (discussing mandatory automobile insurance laws). Congress
therefore acted well within its constitutional authority by adopting a means of
regulation parallel to insurance measures enacted by the states to address
comparable risk-shifting." Brief for Petitioner at 36, NFIB v, Sebelius (U.S. Jun.
28, 2012) (No. 11-393). Auto insurance mandates were touched on superficially in
the oral argument, Transcript of Oral Argument at 65, NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012) (No. 11-393). Sixth Circuit Judge Sutton noted the "related and
familiar mandate of the states-that most adults must purchase car insurance" in his
opinion supporting the constitutionality of the individual mandate, but did not
explore this point in detail. Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529,
565 (6th Cir. 2011).
President Obama mentioned car insurance mandates as precedents but neither
he nor other proponents of the mandates made a detailed argument based on these
mandates. In remarks to Congress, the President in 2009 described the necessity of
everyone participating in a health insurance pool, and explained as follows: "Now,
even if we provide these affordable options [like insurance provided through
exchanges meant to foster competition] there may be those-especially the young
and the healthy-who still want to take the risk and go without coverage.. .The
problem is, such irresponsible behavior costs all the rest of us money. If there are
affordable options and people still don't sign up for health insurance, it means we
pay for those people's expensive emergency room visits.... Unless everybody does
their part, many of the insurance reforms we seek-especially requiring insurance
companies to cover preexisting conditions-just can't be achieved. And that's why
under my plan, individuals will be required to carry basic health insurance-just as
most states require you to carry auto insurance." President Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9,
2009) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pressoffice/Remarks-by-the-President-to-
a-Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky,
Health Reform is Constitutional, POLITICO (Oct. 22, 2009, 4:59 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28620.html (mentioning auto
insurance as a precedent). The idea of a federal individual mandate originated with
the Heritage Foundation over twenty years ago. A 1989 Heritage Foundation
publication, which endorsed the idea of an individual mandate, cited auto
insurance as a precedent, stating that a National Health Plan should: "Mandate all
households to obtain adequate insurance. Many [states] require anybody driving a
280
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This Article, in Part I, makes the argument that auto insurance
mandates are pertinent precedents and draws four important parallels
between auto insurance mandates and the ACA individual mandate. Both
were developed to tackle complex, challenging public policy situations
involving physical harm or illness and how to pay for needed redress or
treatment; they devised similar policy responses to seemingly intractable
dilemmas.'5 Both require people to insure themselves against risks they
may want to bear themselves.' 6 Both require risk-spreading, which is
fundamentally what insurance does.'7 Finally, both require people to buy
something from a private seller rather than having a government program
tackle the problems at which the mandates are aimed; they both embody a
public-private policy approach.'8
Part II discusses the most common rejoinder to the claim that auto
insurance mandates are pertinent precedents, which is that auto insurance is
irrelevant because driving is a choice while living is not. This Part shows
that choice and coercion are much harder to distinguish in this context than
opponents contend. Driving is not always a choice,' 9 the Supreme Court's
decision made clear that the decision whether to purchase insurance for
car to have liability insurance. But neither the federal government nor any state
requires all households to protect themselves from the potentially catastrophic
costs of a serious accident or illness. Under the Heritage [Foundation] plan, there
would be such a requirement." Stuart M. Butler, Assuring Affordable Health Care
for All Americans, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LECTURE No. 218 (Oct. 1, 1989) at 6.
Mandate opponents Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart, and Todd Graziano,
representing a later and very different Heritage Foundation position, wrote a
memorandum in 2009 preemptively deriding the idea of a parallel. Randy Barnett,
Nathaniel Stewart, & Todd Graziano, Why the Personal Mandate to Buy Health
Insurance is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 49
(Dec. 9, 2009) (hereinafter Bamett/Heritage Memo). Although the parts of the
article dealing with car insurance were inaccurate, there was no systematic
response to that part of the memorandum until 2012. See Jennifer Wriggins, Is the
Health Insurance Individual Mandate "Unprecedented? ": The Case of Auto
Insurance Mandates, SSRN (Feb. 25, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract-2011025.
14 See supra note 12.
' See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
' See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.D.
See infra Part II.A.
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those subject to the mandate actually is a choice,2 0 and auto insurance
mandates in fact are more coercive than the ACA mandate.2 1
Finally, the Article in Part III turns to two aspects of the history of
auto insurance mandates. One is the complex evolution of mandates, which
took place over a six decade period.2 2 Now forgotten but relevant today is
that opponents of mandates fought against them for decades, using
arguments about freedom and American values similar to the 'broccoli
argument' used today.23 Yet, in the battle over how to pay for injuries
connected with car accidents, governments did not take over the risk and
publicly fund car accident costs, but rather left the situation to a regulated
market-a market that required individual participation and that broadened
coverage through mandates ordering companies to cover high risk
individuals. The insurance industry developed insurance products to keep
risk privatized and adjusted successfully to the mandates. Not surprisingly,
'freedom' arguments lack resonance today in the auto insurance context.
Also forgotten but relevant is the legal history of auto insurance mandates
and auto insurance regulation.24 The constitutionality of auto insurance
mandates was doubted and challenged all the way to the United States
Supreme Court.25 The Supreme Court and other courts recognized that
insurance laws affecting individuals' and companies' freedom, such as
requiring individuals to buy insurance or companies to cover high risk
drivers, were permissible regulation especially in view of the public
welfare aspect of insurance. With constitutional doubts laid to rest, the
current public-private auto insurance regulation regime, with mandates
20 See infra Part II.B.
21 See infra Part II.C.22 See infra Part III.
23 See infra Part III.A. The "broccoli argument" was a slippery-slope
argument advanced to support the position that the health insurance mandate in the
ACA exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. According to
the "broccoli argument," if Congress has the power to require individuals to
purchase health insurance because it improves their health, which in turn affects
interstate commerce, then Congress could also require individuals to engage in
other health behavior like purchasing broccoli, which seems absurd. See NFIB v.
Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588-89 (2012). But see id. at 2619 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting in part) (responding to broccoli argument). See also Fried, supra note 8
(discussing broccoli argument).24 See infra Part III.B.
25 See Ex parte Poresky, 54 S. Ct. 3, 4 (1933); Calif State Auto. Assoc. Inter-
Insurance Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 107 (1951), discussed infra at Part
III.B.
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coupled with private competition, has thrived for decades, to the benefit of
consumers. This history suggests that the ACA individual mandate may
gain more acceptance as the 'freedom' arguments lose resonance and the
benefits of the ACA become clearer.
This article shows that the ACA mandate is not the anomalous
outlier that its opponents claim and that it follows an American tradition of
tackling a huge problem by a public-private approach of insurance
regulation and mandates. Individual insurance mandates in both the auto
and health contexts are a reasonable approach to widespread problems
through economic regulation, rather than a frightening infringement on
personal freedom.
II. MAKING THE ARGUMENT: PARALLELS BETWEEN THE
ACA AND AUTO INSURANCE INDIVIDUAL MANDATES
This section systematically draws parallels between the
characteristics of auto insurance mandates and the ACA's individual
mandate. Obviously, health insurance and auto insurance are very
different, and insuring people's health raises different issues from insuring
against losses associated with cars.26 Public policy debates about the two
issues have gone on for decades, although the battle over universal health
care has had a higher profile.27 Auto insurance mandates are not
26 See generally ROBERT JERRY & DOUGLAS RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW § 64[c], at 918 (5th ed. 2012); Deborah Stone, The Struggle for
the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L., 287 (1993);
Nicholas Bagley & Jill R. Horwitz, Why It's Called the Affordable Care Act, 110
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1 (2011) (reforms aimed at myriad problems
with U.S. health care system); Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and
Responsibility after the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PENN.
L. REV. 1577 (describing Affordable Care Act as creating a new social contract).
Issues of health care costs and health insurance in the U.S. are tremendously
complex. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITz, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 300-
30 (3d ed. 2000); Amy B. Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory
Critique of ACA, 36 J. OF CORP. L. (2011); Brief of Amici Curiae Economic
Scholars in Support of Petitioners Urging Reversal on the Minimum Coverage
Issue, Health and Human Services v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398)
(describing unique features of health care finance and insurance).
27 See generally Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile
Accidents, Insurance, and the Challenge to the Social Order in the Inter-War
Years: 1919-1941, 4 CONN. INS. L. J. 525 (1997-1998) (describing history of
spread of autos, injuries, and regulatory responses); Bagley & Horwitz, supra note
26, at 8 (battle over universal health coverage has lasted almost 100 years); THEDA
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monolithic; there are several different types of commonly mandated auto
insurance.2 8 Yet, both mandates essentially devised the same policy
response to a huge public policy problem involving how to pay for
treatment or redress for physical illness or harm. The significant
similarities between the mandates are outlined next.
A. BOTH TYPES OF MANDATES APPLY TO COMPLEX,
CHALLENGING SITUATIONS WHERE THERE ARE STRONG POLICY
REASONS FOR MANDATES
1. ACA Individual Mandate
One of the goals of the ACA was to increase health insurance
coverage, and the ACA individual mandate is an important means to that
goal. 29 At the time the ACA was passed, there was bipartisan consensus
that extensive reform of the extremely complex U.S. health insurance
system was urgent.30 The ACA individual mandate was modeled on
Massachusetts' individual mandate that passed in 2006, although the ACA
is a far broader and more complex law than the Massachusetts reforms.31
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 180-93 (1992) (describing early and mid
twentieth century political debates concerning universal health care).
28 Liability insurance, uninsured motorist coverage, Med-pay coverage, and
underinsured motorist coverage are the most common types of auto insurance;
some states have adopted partial no-fault reforms. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note
26, § 130. State mandates for each are enumerated at text accompanying notes 72-
79.
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 18091(2)(C), 18091(2)(I) (2006 & Supp. IV). See generally
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, HEALTH CARE SUPPLEMENT TO
ABRAHAM'S INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 12 (5th ed. 2010).30 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 29, at 6.
31 Michael Isikoff, White House used Mitt Romney health-care law as
blueprint for federal law, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 11, 2011, 6:05 AM), http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/44854320/ns/politics-decision_2012/t/; Health Care: Mass
Observation: Health reform in Massachusetts, the Model for Barack Obama's
version, still has a long way to go before it proves itself ECONOMIST, June 25,
2011, at 37. ROBERT W. SIEFERT & ANDREW P. COHEN, RE-FORMING REFORM:
WHAT THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT MEANS FOR
MASSACHUSETTS 48 (U. Mass. Medical Center for Health Law and Economics &
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Foundation 2010) (federal law modeled
on Massachusetts' law); 111 Cong. Rec. H 13119 (Nov. 18, 2009) (statement of
Rep. Steams) ("In Massachusetts, for example-the public option here in
284
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Major problems that drove the national reform were the large number of
uninsured Americans, the increasing costs and spending, and the uneven
quality of health care in the U.S. 32 Millions of uninsured people receive
health care for free, since laws, customs, and professional obligations have
long mandated hospitals and providers provide care even if a patient cannot
pay. Their bills often are uncollectible.34 These costs are passed on to the
government and private insurers; private insurers raise their premiums.35
As Justice Ginsberg stated: "The net result: Those with health insurance
subsidize the medical care of those without it. As economists would
describe what happens, the uninsured 'free ride' on those who pay for
health insurance." 3 6 Moreover, those without health insurance often do not
get preventive medical care that could reduce their health care costs later
on.37 States had not and would not be able to solve the problems. The
Congress is patterned after Massachusetts."). See also 111 Cong. Rec. S 11990
(Nov. 30, 2009) (Statement of Sen. Enzi ("[a]t the beginning of this process, the
majority staff of the HELP Committee decided they were going to draft a partisan
bill based on the reforms that had recently been adopted in Massachusetts."); 111
Cong. Rec. H 12192 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 2009) (statement of Rep. Roe) ("The
Massachusetts plan had a noble goal, which was to try to cover as many of its
citizens as possible. That's absolutely what we should try to do in an affordable
way. In Massachusetts now, they're at around 97 percent coverage."). Some
information, including a statement by former Governor Romney, indicates that the
Massachusetts health insurance mandate was based on its car insurance mandate.
David A. Fahrenthold, Mass. Bill Requires Health Coverage, State Set to Use Auto
Insurance as a Model, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2006 ("Romney said the bill, modeled
on the state's policy of requiring auto insurance, is intended to end an era in which
550,000 go without insurance and their hospital and doctor visits are paid for in
part with public funds. 'We insist that everybody who drives a car has insurance,'
Romney said in an interview. 'And cars are a lot less expensive than people."').
32 The Census Bureau estimates that 48.6 million Americans were uninsured
in 2011. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C.
SMITH, CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012
pubs/p60-243.pdf; BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40517, HEALTH CARE
REFORM, AN INTRODUCTION (Apr. 14, 2009). Over forty million Americans did
not have health insurance during some part of 2007. Id. at 1.
3 NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
34 d
3 Id.
36 Id. at 2611.
3 1 d. at 2611-12.3 1 d. at 2612.
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mandate went along with other important reforms which prohibited
insurance companies from denying coverage for preexisting conditions or
charging more to insure unhealthy than healthy people.39 Increasing health
insurance coverage made eminent sense as a reform goal.40
The idea of a federal individual mandate had long been suggested
as a way to expand coverage--it was initially proposed by the domestic
policy director of the Heritage Foundation in a 1989 lecture published by
the Heritage Foundation. 41 The Heritage lecture recognized health
insurance as different from other sorts of insurance in that it raised
compelling moral issues of societal responsibility. The lecture claimed:
[H]ealth care is different. If a man is struck down by a
heart attack in the street, Americans will care for him
whether or not he has insurance. If we find that he has
spent his money on other things rather than insurance,
we may be angry but we will not deny him services-
even if that means more prudent citizens end up
picking up the tab. A mandate on individuals
recognizes this implicit contract. Society does feel a
moral obligation to insure that its citizens do not
suffer from the unavailability of health care. But on
the other hand, each household has the obligation, to
39 These are known as the "guaranteed-issue" and "community rating"
provisions. NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012).
40 There was not the political will for a single-payer system or a public option.
See infra note 86. The Affordable Care Act obviously was a political compromise
which did not fundamentally change the structure of U.S. insurance markets and
did not aggressively tackle issues of quality or cost. See generally ABRAHAM &
SCHWARCZ, supra note 29 at 12-13, 20-21. "Moral hazard" is an important
insurance concept that comes into play here. Tom Baker states that the term
"'moral hazard' typically is used to refer to the theoretical tendency for insurance
to reduce incentives (1) to minimize loss or (2) to minimize the cost of a loss."
TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY 4 (2d ed. 2008). The second type, known
as "ex post moral hazard," is implicated here. Abraham and Schwarcz outline the
"ex post moral hazard concern" of health insurance, which is "the risk that
individuals who become sick will over-consume health care because they do not
pay the full cost of such care," ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 29, at 9-10.
The ACA has experimental programs to try to control costs but does little to
change the ex post moral hazard connected with costs. Id. at 21.
41 Butler, supra note 13.
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the extent that it is able, to avoid placing demands on
society by protecting itself.4 2
President Obama also observed that "[U]nless everybody does their part,
many of the insurance reforms we seek-especially requiring insurance
companies to cover preexisting conditions-just can't be achieved," thus
describing it as a way for people to be required to pay their fair share.43
There are compelling, insurance-related reasons, often lost in the
debate, for having the mandate be one of the ways to increase coverage.
The key insurance-related reason for it is to combat "adverse selection,"
which is the tendency for people who are disproportionately likely to
experience an insured-against event to buy insurance for that event." This
leads to a heightened number of claims and increased costs. 4 5 Adverse
selection is a phenomenon in insurance generally and had been common in
the individual health insurance market prior to the ACA's passage.4 6 This
led companies to have broad exclusions in policies for pre-existing
conditions which greatly limited coverage supplied by policies.4 7 In the
health insurance context, the general adverse selection concern is that
people who were healthy would not buy insurance until they thought they
were getting sick, and insurance companies extending insurance would not
know the buyers' exact health status; then cost projections would be
42 Butler, supra note 13, at 6. Butler stated immediately before the passage
quoted above that the Heritage proposed federal individual mandate "assumes that
there is an implicit contract between households and society, based on the notion
that health insurance is not like other forms of insurance protection. If a young
man wrecks his Porsche and has not had the foresight to obtain insurance, we may
commiserate but society feels no obligation to repair his car. But health care is
different." Id.
43 President Barack Obama, Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress on Health
Care (Sept. 10, 2009), supra note 13.
4 BAKER, supra note 40, at 6 (noting that adverse selection in this context
generally refers to "the (theoretical) tendency for high-risk people to be more
interested in insurance than low-risk people." Mark Hall, Commerce Clause
Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PENN. L. REv 1825, 1841 (2011)
(mandate essential to combat adverse selection). ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra
note 29, at 12 (purpose of mandate is to combat adverse selection).
45 BAKER, supra note 40, at 6.
46 See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 29, at 11 (In the individual market,
prior to the ACA, because of adverse selection concerns, almost all policies had
preexisting condition exclusions.).
4 1Id. at 5, 11.
2013 287
CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 19.2
inaccurate, payouts would be excessive, and costs would skyrocket.48 The
ACA itself explains:
[I]f there were no requirement, many individuals would
wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care.
By significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the
requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act,
will minimize the adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement is
essential to creating effective health insurance markets in
which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage for pre-
existing conditions can be sold.49
In other words, the mandate's goal, which was part of the larger reforms, is
to broaden the risk pool so that insurance markets can work better for the
50benefit of consumers.
This broadening of the risk pool was well explained by Justice
Ginsburg:
In the fullness of time.. .today's young and healthy will
become society's old and infirm. Viewed over a lifespan
the costs and benefits even out: The young who pay more
than their fair share currently will pay less than their fair
share when they become senior citizens.. .And even if, as
undoubtedly will be the case, some individuals, over their
lifespans, will pay more for health insurance than they
receive in health services, they have little to complain
about, for that is how insurance works. Every insured
person of the covered class will ultimately need that
protection.
48 Hall, supra note 44, at 1841.
49 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West 2010). ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra
note 29, at 20.
5o 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West 2010). See generally Bagley &
Horwitz, supra note 26.
5 NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2620 (2012). The Commerce Clause
section of Justice Ginsburg's opinion in which this language is found is of course a
dissent, but it is relevant here both because the mandate was upheld and because
her analysis focuses on the health insurance aspects of the Affordable Care Act
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The ACA mandate arose from an urgent situation where reform was
needed for many reasons; these reasons included a huge number of
uninsured people and the costs imposed on the insured by the uninsured.52
Having a mandate that gives an incentive for people to purchase health
insurance, in order to extend coverage and reduce adverse selection, was a
positive policy reform.
2. Auto Insurance Mandates
Auto insurance mandates, which developed over decades, have a
variety of goals.53 The goals include protecting drivers from tort judgments
for damages caused by their negligence, making a pool of money available
to compensate for injuries caused by negligently driven automobiles,
compensating drivers for injuries caused by uninsured and underinsured
drivers, and making sure medical expenses from car accidents are paid
for.54 The development and spread of cars in the United States in the first
half of the twentieth century created many challenges.5 Cars, in addition to
being wonderful instruments of transportation, were mobile instruments of
destruction which easily could kill or maim. 6 Injuries and death caused by
cars were legion, and the best way to encourage safety, provide financial
security for drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, and compensate for
injuries caused by cars was not obvious.57 After decades of legislative
experimentation and industry opposition, the current web of mandates
developed to deal with cars-an expensive and injury-causing necessity.5
which is pertinent to this article. Id. at 2617-18. In contrast, the majority sees
insurance as simply another product. Id. at 2586-87, 2590-91.
52 See supra text accompanying notes 29-40.
53 See discussion infra Part III (discussing the history of auto insurance
mandates).
54 See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY:
INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 85-104 (2008)
[hereinafter LIABILITY]; Simon, supra note 27.
" See generally LIABILITY, supra note 54.
56 See generally Simon, supra note 27. In fact some thought there should be
strict liability for auto injuries under a dangerous instrumentality theory. Id. at 562.
S. Lochlann Jain, "Dangerous Instrumentality ": The Bystander as Subject in
Automobility, 19 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 61, 61-94 (2004). Most people
lacked health and disability insurance and injuries were common, so that injuries
were likely to be calamitous. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 72-73.
5 Simon, supra note 27.
LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 78-103.
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Mandates have proven to be a workable policy approach to the complex
issues presented by the injuries caused by cars. 59
Driving can lead to injuries that have costs of various types,
including injuries that a careless driver causes and injuries that a faultless
driver suffers. These injuries are hard to predict in advance and their costs
may be astronomical. Other than a very few rich people, no one can be
certain that she has the money available to cover those unexpected events.
Mandatory auto insurance turns many accidents that would be financial
60
disasters into mere inconveniences.
Without mandates, adverse selection, described above, can occur.
61 People who know they are most at risk for a particular harm will tend to
buy insurance, while those who are at lower risk will tend not to buy it.
What then can happen is that insurance companies' costs are higher than
expected, which results in rate increases or company failure.6 2
In the auto insurance context, adverse selection is rarely discussed
because of auto insurance individual mandates which by definition
minimize adverse selection.63 But if there were no individual mandates,
adverse selection could easily arise -- dangerous but wealthy drivers who
fear tort judgments might seek liability insurance to protect their assets in
case they injure someone through their carelessness. At the same time,
people who are confident in their own carefulness might choose not to buy
liability insurance. That might make the liability insurance pool more full
of risky drivers than insurance companies anticipated, resulting in higher-
59Id. at 102. This is not to say that mandates are perfect. See infra note 65.
60 LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 102.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
62 See supra p. 34.
63 Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of
One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 888 (1986) (noting that since
car insurance is mandatory, adverse selection concerns are lessened); See Robert
Hockett, Making Sense of the Health-Care Reform Debate, 53 CHALLENGE 28, 44
(Jan-Feb 2010) ("[A] principal means of avoiding the adverse selection problem is
by requiring participation by all, in order that no particular inference need be
drawn from somebody's seeking to participate. But only the state has authority to
require that people participate in insurance pools-as states routinely do, for
example, with driver's insurance, social security, and Medicare... [I]n requiring
participation in such insurance pools, government is doing more than addressing
the adverse-selection obstacle to well-functioning insurance arrangements. It is
also preventing a form of free-riding-for example, that of uninsured motorists
upon the coverage of insured motorists.").
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than-predicted costs. 4 This could further result in skyrocketing rates and
insurance company failure. Further, if many drivers do not buy insurance,
rates go up for those who do, and the victims of many accidents go
uncompensated, which spreads the costs throughout society. But even very
careful drivers must buy auto liability insurance. After all, they might be
careless and cause an accident that they could not pay for - even though
that is unlikely. Their liability insurance keeps them from financial ruin
and helps compensate the injured person. If the careful driver's insurance
does not cover the accident costs, and the driver cannot afford those costs
out-of-pocket, the costs fall only on the victim or are passed on to society.
Combating adverse selection through individual auto insurance mandates
which allow competition and comparison shopping has proven to be
workable, successful policy.65
6 Since there are mandates this is necessarily hypothetical, but it logically
follows from the concept of adverse selection. Wortham, supra note 63 (noting
that since car insurance is mandatory, adverse selection concerns are lessened).
65 Of course, auto insurance mandates are not a perfect solution to the
problems they tackle; nor is there a perfect solution. They may have inflationary
effects on health costs. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 103. They may lead to more
accidents than there would be without insurance because of the "moral hazard"
effect of having liability coverage. Alma Cohen & Rajeeve Dehejia, The Effect of
Auto Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & EcON.
357, 357 (2004) (arguing that auto insurance mandates have led to increases in
fatalities due to moral hazard effect of insurance). For discussion of "moral
hazard" concept, see supra note 40. Auto insurance mandates (and the way they
are priced) may encourage more driving than is environmentally beneficial. See
generally Jennifer B. Wriggins, Automobile Injuries as Injuries with Remedies:
Driving, Insurance, Torts, and Changing the 'Choice Architecture' of Auto
Insurance Pricing, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REv 69, 73-80 (2010). There are persistent
equity issues in the way insurance companies classify risk. See, e.g., King v.
Meese, 743 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1987) (classification by insurance companies of safe
drivers who live in South Central Los Angeles as high risk drivers, and requiring
them therefore to pay more is constitutional). See generally KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1986) [hereinafter DISTRIBUTING RISK]; Regina Austin, The Insurance
Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 517 (1983); Wortham, supra note
63.
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B. BOTH TYPES OF MANDATE REQUIRE PEOPLE TO INSURE
THEMSELVES AGAINST RISKS THEY MAY WANT TO BEAR
THEMSELVES
1. ACA individual mandate
A person may want to set aside the money that she may need to
pay medical and hospital bills if she becomes ill or has an accident, rather
than purchase insurance in advance. This is known as self-insuring.6 For
example, Kaj Ahlberg, one of the individual plaintiffs in Florida v. U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, which was also decided as part
of NFIB v. Sibelius, filed a declaration stating he has no health insurance
and has "no desire or intention to buy health insurance in the future, as I
am now and reasonably expect to remain, financially capable of paying for
my and my family's health care services out of my own resources as
needed."67 Plaintiff Ahlberg also stated that he thought health insurance
was not a "sensible or acceptable" use of his financial resources.68 This
idea that a person should be able to self-insure for medical costs deeply
resonates with the freedom and coercion arguments that underlay the
plaintiffs' Commerce Clause arguments. 69 But if a person is one of those
affected by the ACA individual mandate, her choice to self-insure will
have a cost-she will have to either buy health insurance or make the
66 Robert Jerry and Douglas Richmond explain as follows: "Sometimes people
cope with risk through self-insurance. For example, a restaurant owner, cognizant
of the possibility that a person may contract food poisoning, is likely to take
substantial preventive measures to limit the risk of such an occurrence. After
taking such steps, a remote risk nonetheless exists that a customer might be
poisoned. The owner may calculate that such an event will rarely occur and may
conclude that if it does occur the damages associated with such an event could
easily be paid from the owner's assets. Alternatively, the owner may choose to set
aside a portion of each year's profits into a reserve fund designated to pay the loss
should it occur. In either case, the owner chooses to bear the risk. This is the
essence of self-insurance." JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, § 10.
67 Declaration of Kaj Ahlburg in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, 4, Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Case No,:
3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, U.S.D.C., N.D. Fla. Pensacola, Order Granting Summary
Judgment, 15. Similarly, Mary Brown's declaration stated that she "is subject to
the individual mandate and objects to being required to comply as she does not
believe the cost of health insurance is a wise or acceptable use of her resources."
Id. at 14 (quoting Mary Brown's declaration).
68 Ahlburg declaration, supra note 67, at 7.69 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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Shared Responsibility Payment.70 For those to whom the ACA mandate
applies, the government is telling people they are not allowed to "freely"
bear risks that they might want to, and might be perfectly capable of,
bearing themselves.
2. Auto insurance individual mandates
A driver may want to set aside the money that she will have to pay
if she injures someone through negligence rather than purchase insurance
to cover that risk. She may currently be able to, and expect to remain able
to pay for harm she might cause through her carelessness, so she may want
to self-insure against that risk. But the requirements in 49 states that she
buy liability insurance before registering a car and driving, on pain of civil
or criminal penalties, 71 covering what she would have to pay if she injured
someone through negligence, deny her that "free" choice of setting aside
the funds in advance.7 2
70 See infra text accompanying notes 122-27 (discussing the Shared
Responsibility Payment); see infra Part II (discussing choice and coercion as ways
to distinguish between auto insurance mandates and the ACA mandate).
71 INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Compulsory Auto/Uninsured
Motorists (Feb. 2013), http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/compulsory
(49 states and the District of Columbia in 2012 had mandatory liability auto
insurance). State laws require drivers to purchase liability coverage in specified
minimum amounts. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, § 132. New Hampshire
does not require every driver to purchase liability insurance but does require all
drivers to show they are financially responsible and requires drivers who have
been convicted of driving under the influence to purchase liability insurance. N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 264 (LexisNexis 2011). According to one treatise published in
1974, around the time many insurance mandates were passed, liability insurance is
aimed at alleviating two major problems: "1. Protecting the tortfeasor of an
automobile accident from financial disaster resulting from a judgment rendered
against him in a court of law. 2. Providing compensation for the victim of an
accident for injuries received from the accident." M.G. WOODRUFF III, JOHN R.
FONSECA & ALPHONSE M. SQUJLLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No-FAULT
LAW § 3:1 (1974). See CALvIN H. BRAINARD, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 16
(Richard D. Irwin, Inc. ed., 1961) (liability coverage has dual purpose of
protecting the finances of the insured and the victim).
72Liability insurance "pays proceeds to a third party to whom an insured
becomes liable." BAKER, supra note 40, at 23. Liability insurance pays, on behalf
of a negligent driver, money that the negligent driver owes to his victim up to a set
limit purchased in advance. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 924.
Enforcement is through the torts system. Id.
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Similarly, this same driver may want to set aside the money for a
different risk, namely the risk that she or a passenger will suffer injuries
from a negligent driver who does not have insurance or who is a hit-and-
run driver. This driver who wants to self-insure may think that the risk of
being injured by a hit-and-run or uninsured driver is low, that she has
sufficient resources to cover her and her passengers' injuries in that kind of
a situation, and that purchasing insurance to cover that risk is a waste of
money.73 However, laws in twenty-two jurisdictions require that this driver
buy insurance for the risk to herself and her passengers from being struck
by an uninsured or hit-and-run driver; this is known as uninsured motorist
coverage.7 4
Laws in a few states will tell this same motorist that even if she
does not want to buy insurance coverage for her own or her passengers'
medical bills, she must buy it (up to a certain limit).7 5 And laws in eight
states tell this driver that she also must buy insurance to cover the risk that
she (or her passengers) will be injured by a driver who does not have
73 Perhaps she has excellent health insurance and disability insurance, and she
would rather self-insure against these risks than purchase insurance for them.
74 Insurance protecting drivers from risks created by other drivers who may
lack insurance is known as uninsured motorist coverage. ALAN I. WIDISS &
JEFFREY E. THOMAS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE 8
(3d ed. 2005). Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia require drivers to
purchase it. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Compulsory
Auto/Uninsured Motorists (Feb. 2013),
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/compulsory; Memo from
Christopher Harmon to Jennifer Wriggins August 24, 2012 (twenty-one states and
the District of Columbia require uninsured motorists coverage; Insurance
Information Institute Memo does not list Connecticut) (on file with the author);
WIDISS & THOMAS, supra, at 8; 6 NEw APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY
EDITION § 61.02[3][a][ii] (Christopher J. Robinette ed. 2012). For more detail on
uninsured motorist coverage and its historical development see infra note 159.
' This is known as Med-Pay coverage. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 79-80. It
is required for all drivers in Colorado, Maine, and Pennsylvania. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 10-4-635 (2012) (passed in 2004), ME. REv. STAT. tit. 29 § 1605-A (2012)
(Maine, passed in 1997), 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1711 (West 2006) (passed in
1984). New Hampshire requires that auto liability policies contain Med-Pay
coverage, although New Hampshire is the only state that does not require all
drivers to purchase liability coverage. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 264:16 (LexisNexis
2011) (passed in 1971). See LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 79-80 (noting Med-Pay
coverage began in mid-twentieth century and allowed coverage of medical
expenses before health insurance became widespread).
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sufficient insurance to cover her or her passengers' injuries. Finally, laws
in sixteen states require her to buy "no-fault" coverage that covers part of
accident expenses regardless of driver carelessness. 7 Again, even if this
driver is currently, and expects to remain able to cover the potential costs,
she is not allowed to do that without risking civil or criminal penalties in
the states where this coverage is required.
States have long legislated that individuals may not decide to self-
insure against many risks of auto use, including risks to themselves, their
passengers, or their own assets. While some of these are risks to others,
some are risks to the driver herself. Mandatory car insurance, in all its
various forms,7 8 is an example of the government telling drivers that they
are not allowed to bear risks that they might want to, and might be
perfectly capable of, bearing themselves.79
C. BOTH TYPES OF MANDATES REQUIRE THAT RISKS BE
TRANSFERRED AND SPREAD, WHICH IS FUNDAMENTALLY
WHAT INSURANCE DOES
The various mandates require transfer and spreading of risk, which
80are essential yet often forgotten aspects of insurance.
76 This is known as "underinsured motorist coverage." WIDISS & THOMAS,
supra note 74, § 31.4. Eight states mandate that drivers buy this coverage, so that
if they are harmed by a careless driver who does not have sufficient liability
insurance to cover their injuries, they will have sufficient coverage under their
own 'underinsured motorist' coverage. NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra
note 74, at VOL. 6 § 61.02[3][aj[ii].
77 See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 74. This no-fault
coverage often is known as Personal Injury Protection (PIP) and can cover medical
expenses, lost wages, and rehabilitation expenses depending on the state. JERRY &
RICHMOND, supra note 26, § 132.
78 The forms mentioned above are liability insurance, uninsured motorist
coverage, Med-Pay coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, and no-fault
elements. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
79 For discussion of choice and coercion in the two contexts, see infra Part II.
80 According to insurance scholar Tom Baker, "[A] risk transfer is.. .a
transaction or institutional arrangement that transfers, or shifts, risk from one
person or entity to another... [R]isk spreading occurs whenever an entity takes on
risk and parcels it out to a group of people. Insurance is the paradigmatic risk-
spreading institution. Many people pay relatively small amounts of money so that
there is a large pot of money to cover the costs of the unfortunate few who suffer a
loss." BAKER, supra note 40, at 2. Insurance scholar Kenneth Abraham describes
the same process with somewhat different terminology: "[I]nsurance is a method
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1. ACA individual mandate
Congress chose to approach health care reform with a private
insurance framework rather than public funding; this meant that risk-
sharing between individuals was an essential aspect of the plan. If I am one
of those affected by the mandate, the premiums that someone else pays
may end up benefitting me if I become a victim of a disease or injury.
Those premiums will help pay the hospitals and doctors that provide
medical care for me, and they may total much, much more than the cost of
my premiums. Correlatively, health insurance premiums that I pay may
wind up benefitting not me but someone else who is a victim of a disease
82or injury. This pooling and transferring of risk is the essence of insurance.
2. Auto insurance individual mandates
States have chosen to respond to the myriad injury problems
caused by autos through a private insurance framework rather than public
funding. Having liability insurance means that other people's premiums
may end up benefitting me if I cause an accident through carelessness,
because the premiums other people have paid for their liability insurance
may be used to help pay the judgment or settlement that compensates for
the injury I caused through carelessness. Also, other people's premiums
may help me if I am a victim of an accident caused by someone else's
carelessness, since those premiums will help pay for the compensation I
receive from the injurer's liability policy. Alternatively, my premiums may
of managing risk by distributing it among large numbers of individuals or
enterprises." ABRAHAM, supra note 65. See NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2620 (2012) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting "that is how insurance works.").
81 As Tom Baker explains, "[m]any, perhaps most, people in the United States
never realize that, if they are lucky, most of their premiums for most forms of
insurance will go to pay other people's claims. Indeed, one of the most common
images of insurance is quite similar to that of a savings account.... [People] often
expect that over the course of a lifetime the deposits made by each person should
roughly equal the withdrawals on that person's insurance account.... [W]hen it
comes to health, disability, property, and term life insurance, if your withdrawals
equal your deposits, you have had, at least in some respects, a very unfortunate
life. If you are fortunate, your insurance dollars go to pay other people's claims."
BAKER, supra note 40, at 14.
82 Id. at 2, 14.
83 Id. at 14 (describing how one's insurance premium dollars may go to pay
others' claims, or vice versa).
296
MANDATES, MARKETS, AND RISK
end up benefitting not me but someone who negligently causes an accident
or a victim who suffers an injury from someone else's carelessness. This
sharing and shifting of risk is what insurance does.
D. BOTH TYPES OF MANDATE REQUIRE PEOPLE TO BUY
SOMETHING FROM A PRIVATE SELLER
Both mandates require people to buy something from a private
seller since they are based on the very American idea that competition
among insurance companies, combined with laws requiring coverage, will
benefit consumers more than having a government program alone deal
with the situation.84
1. ACA individual mandate
Congress could have chosen to fund health care costs in a
different way, for example through universal public insurance funded
through its power to tax. It could have expanded existing government
health care funding such as the Medicare and Medicaid programs that
currently provide health care to millions who fit specific eligibility criteria
84 Workers compensation legislation takes a somewhat similar, private-public
approach to insurance for workers' injuries. In every state but Texas, employers of
a certain size must participate. 1 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §
2.06, at 2-12 (MATTHEW BENDER & Co. 2009), VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN
GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 651 (4th ed. 2009) (noting that
participation in Texas is optional but encouraged). In most states, employers
obtain insurance through the private market. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 60.
Fourteen states have a "public option" of state-run insurance that competes with
private insurers, while six states have government-run funds that monopolize the
field of coverage. Id. at 60-61. The large majority of states allow employers to
self-insure for groups. Christine Fuge, The Workers Compensation Self-Insurance
Decision, INT'L RISK MGM'T INS. (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2001/fuge08.aspx. This approach to workers
compensation is what Professor Abraham calls a "mixed public-private insurance
approach," and contrasts with systems in other countries where workplace injury
costs are compensated through their social welfare systems. LIABILITY, supra note
38, at 61. See generally SKOCPOL, supra note 27, at 285-302 (describing history of
workers compensation reforms and particularly the failure of more comprehensive
policies), JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW
(2004) (outlining history of workers compensation legislation). For further
discussion of workers compensation law history, see infra note 180.
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to cover everyone.8 ' But that would have been dramatically different from
the ACA, which largely leaves the system of governmental provision of
health insurance in place and adopts a mostly privatized system for health
care not covered by governmental programs.8 6 One of the goals of the
ACA and the mandate was to increase competition and choice for the
benefit of consumers. It will use a system of state exchanges which will
allow variations between states as to basic requirements for policies and
will allow consumers to comparison shop for policies that are most
beneficial for them and their families. Since the mandate does not go into
effect until 2014, at the present one cannot point to existing increased
competition for customers.
2. Auto insurance individual mandates
It would be possible to have the losses caused by car accidents be
paid for in a totally different way, perhaps through a no-fault insurance
plan or government programs funded by tax revenue. 89 But legislatures
have decided that mandates setting a floor for coverage and mandates that
85 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 29, at 5.
86 Id. The mandate was far from a single-payer system and did not even
include a public option. Shalagh Murray & Lori Montgomery, Senate Democrats
Largely Support Health Care Deal that Drops Public Option, WASH. POST, Dec.
10, 2009, at Al; see also Dems Make Deal to Drop Public Option, CBS NEWS
(Dec. 9, 2009, 12:35 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_1 62-5943452.html.
87 See Putting Americans in Control of Their Health Care, WHITEHOUSE, Title
I. Quality, Affordable Health Care for all Americans, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
whitehouse.gov/health-care-meeting/proposal/titlei (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (
"Americans without insurance coverage will be able to choose the insurance
coverage that works best for them in a new open competitive insurance market-
the same insurance market that every member of Congress will be required to use
for their insurance...").
88 See supra note 87; Louise Radnofsky, Puzzling Over What to Call State
Insurance Exchanges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2012, at A7; ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ,
supra note 29, at 15.
89 In fact, a no-fault plan modeled on workers compensation insurance (known
as the Columbia Plan) was proposed in 1932 by prominent experts but it never
became law in any state. Simon, supra note 27, at 585-87; LIABILITY, supra note
54, at 4-7. Other efforts to replace the liability system for auto accidents with a no-
fault system did not lead to comprehensive reform. Id. at 92-100. For a recent
analysis of the failure of no-fault to spread more widely, see Nora Freeman
Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault's "Demise," 61 DEPAUL L.
REv. 303 (2012).
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companies cover high-risk drivers, together with competition among
companies and the common law theory of negligence liability are the best
way to approach the funding of the costs of accidents.90 Auto insurance
mandates have led to fierce competition and continued innovation. 91 They
exemplify how government mandates coupled with private competition
have resulted in a successful system which extends coverage and shares
risk very broadly, bringing many benefits to consumers. 92
E. CONCLUSION
There are significant similarities between the mandates. First, they
both are ways to tackle public policy dilemmas that have no easy solution,
and there are strong policy reasons for mandates in each context. Second,
they direct people to insure themselves against risks they may want to
handle through setting money aside rather than through buying insurance.
Third, they require that risks be pooled and transferred, which is a
fundamental function of insurance. Fourth, they both are based on the very
American idea that, rather than a government takeover of a problem,
competition among private companies, together with laws requiring
coverage and regulating insurance, will benefit the public more. In the auto
context, mandates have developed into system which is so workable and
widely accepted that most people do not think about it much.93 The
parallels between the two types of requirements are striking, and show that
90 Each state has a high risk plan which requires insurance companies to offer
coverage to drivers considered too risky to insure. See infra notes 112-16 and
accompanying text. Liability for car accidents has long been based on the common
law theory of negligence. Simon, supra note 27, at 561; JERRY & RICHMOND,
supra note 26, at §§ 131-32. However, cases almost always settle and treatment of
claims is generally routinized and without deep inquiry into fault. See generally
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight & Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 805
(2011) (describing how routinization distances damage determinations from fault
determinations).
9 See e.g., Deregulating Auto Insurance: Hearing Before H. Comm. on
Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation (Aug. 1, 2001)
(statement of Robert E. Litan, Vice President, Economic Studies Program at
Brookings Institution), available at
http://.www.brookings.edu/testimony/2001/0801businesslitan.aspx (testimony
stating that insurance for automobiles is a competitive market, and with the advent
of the intemet it will be more so); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 918-19
(describing pay-as-you-drive developments). See infra note 169.
92 See infra pp. 37-39.
93 LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 102.
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the ACA individual mandate is neither the anomaly nor the unprecedented
intrusion on individual freedom which its opponents claim.94 This in turn
leads which leads to discussion of the claim that auto insurance mandates
are completely distinguishable because driving is a choice.
III. CHOICE, FREEDOM, AND COERCION
The most common response to the example of car insurance
mandates as precedents is that auto insurance mandates are totally different
because driving is a choice.95 This "choice rejoinder" of mandate critics
asserts that one can choose to drive or not to drive and government can
regulate because driving is a choice.96 By contrast, there is no choice in the
ACA mandate context; one must buy the insurance simply because one is
alive. Critics claim that the ACA mandate is deeply coercive, in contrast
to auto insurance mandates 98 This Part will show that the line between
choice and coercion does not track the two kinds of mandates in that way.
First, driving often is not a choice but a necessity, as cases and statutes
94 See, e.g., Barnett/Heritage Memo, supra note 13.
9 See, e.g., Michael Tanner, Individual Mandates for Health Insurance:
Slippery Slope to National Health Care, CATO INSTITUTE (Policy Analysis No.
568), Apr. 5, 2006, at 10 n. 13 ("If one does not like the regulations, including an
insurance mandate, one can choose not to drive. A health insurance mandate
would not generally give people such a choice."); Barnett/Heritage Memo, supra
note 13, at 6; America's Newsroom, Interview by Bill Henner with George Pataki,
former N.Y. Governor (FOX Television Broadcast Sept. 6, 2010) (Former
Governor George Pataki of New York was asked in a September 2010 interview,
'what's the difference between being required to carry auto insurance and the
requirement to carry health insurance?' He responded: The difference is, if you
want to drive a car on a public street in this country, you are asking the
government for the right to do something. You don't have a right to go on a public
highway. And when you do go on a public road, you can pose [] risk to someone
else out there. So clearly the government has the right to say that you should know
how to drive and you should have insurance if you do. But the health-care bill
says, if you don't want to do anything, if you just want to sit home and not
participate, we're going to fine you, because we're going to make you participate
in this program,' Interviewer: 'So, it is mandatory participation, it's not voluntary
as is the case when you choose to drive a car?' Mr. Pataki: 'When you choose to
drive.').
96See supra note 95.
97See supra note 95.
98 See, e.g., Barnett/Heritage Memo supra note 13, at 6; Tanner, supra note
95; America's Newsroom, supra note 95.
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have long recognized. 99 Second, for those to whom the ACA mandate
might apply, there is a choice between buying insurance and making a
Shared Responsibility Payment, which is not different in kind from other
government incentives and taxes. 00 Third, auto insurance mandates
actually are more coercive than the ACA mandate.' 0 In short, the ACA
mandate involves less coercion and more choice than its opponents claim,
and car mandates involve more coercion and less choice than is commonly
recognized. Therefore, the ACA mandate cannot be dismissed as coercive
while accepting car insurance mandates as not coercive.
A. DRIVING IS NOT A PURE "CHOICE"
Characterizing driving as a pure choice has no footing in the reality
of most Americans' lives. Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney
articulated this in a 2011 interview: "[T]he government of course has a lot
of mandates, and I know folks don't like that-mandates kids go to school,
mandates they have to have auto insurance if they have an automobile. And
my conservative friends say, well, we don't have to have automobiles; well
what state do you live in? Of course you have to have automobiles in this
nation.'02 Romney's point is simply that automobiles and driving are
necessities in the U.S. Driving is very often not a pure choice but rather is
essential for making a living and just for living; it is a constrained decision
shaped not only by individuals and households but by government policy
at all levels.103
Cases and statutes have long recognized that driving is not an
'extra' or a choice, but that it is necessary for people to be able to earn a
living. For example, in the context of drivers' licenses, the United States
Supreme Court wrote that once the state issues licenses, "their continued
9 See infra Part II.A.
'oo See infra Part II.B.
10' See infra Part II.C.
102The O'Reilly Factor, Interview by Bill O'Reilly with Former Governor Mitt
Romney, Presidential Candidate (FOX Television Broadcast, Sept. 13, 2011).
103 It is true that in some parts of the United States such as Manhattan in New
York City, driving is not essential. But those parts are the exception and tend to be
expensive. See Genevieve Guiliano & Susan Hanson, Managing the Auto, in THE
GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 385 (Susan Hanson & Genevieve
Guiliano, eds., 3d ed. 2004) ("The U.S. has the highest rate of private vehicle
ownership, the highest level of daily miles traveled and the lowest rates of trip-
making by modes other than the auto [in the world.]").
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possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood." 104
Therefore, procedural due process must be given before a license may be
suspended. os If the ability to drive had not been an element of "life,
liberty, or property," in this case property, no process would have been
due.106 The Supreme Court also has recognized that many are dependent on
driving in order to make a living.10 7
The Supreme Court of Michigan considered driving to be a
necessity when determining the constitutionality of comprehensive auto
insurance reform in the 1978 case of Shavers v. Kelley. 08 Upholding the
reforms in general but specifying that auto insurance had to be provided at
equitable and fair rates, the court explained as follows:
In Michigan the independent mobility provided by an
automobile is a crucial, practical necessity; it is undeniable
that whether or not a person can obtain a driver's license or
register and operate his motor vehicle profoundly affects
important aspects of his day-to-day life.' 09
The court noted that under the law, without insurance, a person could not
register her vehicle, and "the interest in registering and operating a vehicle
is as significant as the interest in the use of a driver's license.""o
Therefore, the state's auto insurance laws had to guarantee that rates were
not arbitrary or unfair in order to be constitutional."'
Every state's laws treat driving as more of a necessity than a
choice since every state has a requirement that auto insurers cover high risk
'1 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
1os According to Laurence Tribe, the court's decisions in this area have largely
abandoned "whatever had remained of the rights-privileges distinction."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988). See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
lo6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
'0oSee Calif. State Auto. Assoc. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105,
107 (1951), discussed infra at Part III.B.
108 Shavers v. Kelley, 402 Mich. 554, 598 (1978), cert denied, 442 U.S. 934
(1979).
109 Id
"0 Id. at 599.
' Id. at 600. The court's decision gave the legislature and the state
commissioner eighteen months to ensure that rates were equitable and fair. The
Supreme Court denied cert, and there is no further history. See supra note 108.
302
MANDATES, MARKETS, AND RISK
individuals so that those individuals can drive. 112 This is a mandate on
insurance companies. Rather than simply allowing insurance companies to
deny coverage to risky drivers so that they cannot drive, all states have
developed a plan so that high risk drivers can get behind the wheel, backed
by insurance.' 13 As noted in one treatise: "[t]he need for such a plan is
instantly recognizable. The only alternatives are either to impose a
disproportionate number of bad risks upon a few insurers . .. or to disallow
these [bad] risks the opportunity to drive. Neither alternative is acceptable
to the parties involved."ll4 If driving
was seen as merely optional, this universal market regulation would never
have developed." 5 As insurance law professor Kenneth Abraham explains,
[t]he current emphasis on various kinds of residual markets
in the automobile insurance field reveals a great deal about
the centrality of the automobile in our culture. The use of
an automobile at a tolerable cost has become almost a
fundamental right; the maintenance of residual markets
that assure all drivers minimum insurance coverage
follows from and reflects this development."' 6
Although it would be reasonable to exclude high-risk drivers from
coverage and thus from driving, no state agrees because of the importance
of driving and car access.
On any given day, over two-thirds of Americans aged fifteen and
112 '[A]ll states have some kind of high-risk or "residual market plan" through
which automobile insurance is sold to people unable to obtain insurance in the
voluntary market. The most common mechanism in the states is the "assigned risk
plan" under which insurers doing business in a state are required to insure some
portion of otherwise uninsurable risks.' JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, §
22[e]. This is also known as the involuntary market. Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst.
(Jan. 25, 2011), www.iii.org/issueupdates/residual-markets.htm. These
requirements and their history are discussed more fully at infra Part III.A;
litigation about the constitutionality of one state's high risk plan is discussed more
fully at infra Part III.B.
1" See infra Part III.
114 WOODRUFF, FONSECA, & SQUILLANTE, supra note 71, § 3:35, at 99
(emphasis added).
11 See ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 65, at 216, 219. See infra
Part III.
116 ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 65, at 219.
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older are behind the wheel of a car for at least an hour.'17 Roughly 80% of
adult Americans have a drivers' license."'8 The "free choice" to drive is
affected by state and federal transportation policy as well as local zoning
laws, all of which have a significant impact on the form and character of
cities, suburbs, and rural areas." 9 Being able to drive a working car is
essential for suburban and rural transportation in the U.S.1 20 The respective
locations of work, schools, shopping, medical care and housing often
leave individuals with no real choice as to whether or not to drive. 121
1" Spotlight on Statistics: Automobiles, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/201 1/auto (Oct. 2011).
118 Press release, National Safety Council, Licensed Drivers and Number in
Accidents by Age: 2009 (Sept. 30, 2009) (on file with the author) (211 million
Americans have drivers licenses).
119 See Michael Lewyn, How Government Regulation Forces Americans Into
Their Cars: A Case Study, 19 WIDENER L. J. 839, 839-40 (2007) (showing how
zoning and other regulations disadvantage pedestrians); John Pucher, Public
Transportation, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 202, 217 (Susan
Hanson & Genevieve Guiliano, eds., 3d. ed. 2004); ANDRES DuANY, ELIZABETH
PLATER-ZYBECK, & JEFF SPECK, SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND
THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM xiii (2000). The Federal policies include
the federal guarantee of home mortgages, the home mortgage interest deduction,
and federal road building and utility subsidies. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women's
Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-Family Balance, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1797, 1842-49 (2007). State policies include zoning for
building type, separate use zoning, and lack of regional planning. Id. at 1846-50.
120 DUANY, ET AL., supra note 119, at 25 (cars are essential for life in
suburbs); Lisa R. Pruitt, Missing the Mark: Welfare Reform and Rural Poverty, 10
J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 439, 454-58 (2007) (detailing transportation issues for
rural women).
121 See DUANY ET AL., supra note 119. The exact causal mechanisms of sprawl
are disputed. See, e.g., ROBERT BRUEGMAN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY
(2005), JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN
TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND-USE (2006). Regardless of the exact
causal mechanism, major structural factors sharply constrain individuals' choice.
See, e.g., Katharine B. Silbaugh, Wal-Mart's Other Woman Problem: Sprawl and
Work-Family Balance, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1713 (2007). Moreover, when gas prices
rise, polls find many Americans suffer hardship, revealing the speciousness of the
notion that driving is an optional activity. See Gary Langer & Gregory Holyk, Gas
Prices Slam Mobility and Obama's Popularity, ABC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/gas-prices-slam-drivers-obamas-poll-
numbers/story?id=13453640 ("with gas prices up 26% to an average of $3.88 a
gallon, seven in ten Americans in this ABC News/Washington Post poll report
financial hardship as a result, six in 10 say they have cut back on driving.");
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B. THE ACA INDIVIDUAL MANDATE CREATES A CHOICE
The ACA mandate gives those who are subject to it a choice
between obtaining health insurance and paying the 'Shared Responsibility
Payment,' which is by statute always less than the cost of the insurance. 12 2
Justice Roberts concluded that the Shared Responsibility Payment was for
constitutional purposes a valid tax, and asserted that "imposition of a
tax... leaves an individual with a lawful choice to do or not do a certain
act."l 2 3 The lack of additional consequences was significant in determining
that the mandate could validly be seen as a tax. He noted that "[n]either the
Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying
health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS. The government .
. . confirm[s] that if someone chooses to pay [the Shared Responsibility
Payment] rather than obtain health insurance, they have fully complied
with the law." 24 The Shared Responsibility Payment, as Justice Roberts
explained, is like many other types of government policy aimed to
influence behavior.125 It makes the decision to self-insure for medical
expenses more costly than it would be otherwise.126 He explained in a
Michael D. Shear, High Gas Prices Give G.O.P. Issue to Attack Obama, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2012). Proposals to increase the gas tax, which has not been raised
since 1993, consistently have met with defeat because of political opposition.
Brian D. Taylor, The Geography of Urban Transportation Finance, in THE
GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 294, 307-10. Gas prices in Europe are
roughly four times higher than in the U.S., and the large majority of the
differential is due to higher gas prices. John Pucher, Public Transportation, in THE
GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 207, 217. These responses show that
driving is seen as a necessity, as indeed it is. Further, they demonstrate how
vacuous it is to assert that the decision whether or not to drive is a pure choice.
122NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595-96 (2012). The shared
responsibility payment per individual will be either $695 indexed for inflation in
later years, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(A) (2010), or 2.5% of household income. Id.
at § 5000A(c)(2)(B)(iii). For more information see DAVID NEWMAN,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND RELATED
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER PPACA 8-11 (2011),
http://healthreformgps.org/wp-content/uploads/CRSreportonPPACAug201 .pdf.
For instance, a single individual with no dependents with an income of $40,000
will pay about $750 in 2016, whereas the same individual with $100,000 in annual
income will pay about $2,500. Id.
12 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
124 Id. at 2597.
' Id. at 2596.
126 Id. at 2597.
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footnote:
Of course, individuals do not have a lawful choice not to pay a tax
due, and may sometimes face prosecution for failing to do so
(although not for declining to make the shared responsibility
payment, see 26 U.S.C. §5000A(g)(2)). But that does not show
that the tax restricts the lawful choice whether to undertake or
forgo the activity on which the tax is predicated. Those subject to
the individual mandate may lawfully forgo health insurance and
pay higher taxes, or buy health insurance and pay lower taxes. The
only thing they may not lawfully do is not buy health insurance
and not pay the resulting tax.'27
The ACA individual mandate will impose financial costs on some, as do
many government activities, but that is a different matter from taking away
individual choice.
C. AUTO INSURANCE MANDATES ARE FAR MORE COERCIVE
THAN THE ACA INDIVIDUAL MANDATE.
States' auto insurance mandates actually are more coercive than
the ACA individual mandate in at least two ways. First is in the reach of
the mandates. Auto insurance mandates (and they typically require the
purchase of several types of insurance) apply to everyone who is a licensed
driver and car owner, requiring drivers to buy insurance they may not want
to buy, at the risk of fines or jail sentences.128 It is probably impossible to
accurately estimate the number of people who buy auto liability and other
auto insurance solely because of mandates, but it seems safe to say that this
figure is probably in the tens of millions.129 These mandates certainly affect
the finances of those subject to them, and they may override decisions
about risk and budgets of people who must comply with them (i.e. all
127 Id. at 2600 n. 11 (emphasis added). See supra Part II.
128 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
129 With an estimated 211 million licensed drivers, and over 125 million
automobiles registered in 2011, this admittedly vague estimate seems fair. See
supra note 118 for an estimate of driver's license holders. See State Motor- Vehicle
Registrations - 2011, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. (2012),
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2011 /pdf/mvl.pdf
(Estimating total number of automobiles (excluding trucks, buses) registered in
2011: 125,656,528, and estimating number of all motor vehicle registrations in
2011 to be 244,778,179).
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drivers). The ACA, by contrast, may require roughly six million
Americans to purchase insurance or make the Shared Responsibility
Payment, a far smaller number. 13 0 Further, the ACA contains a hardship
exemption, as well as other exemptions from the usual Shared
Responsibility Payment for not obtaining insurance in the ACA.13 ' The
large majority of Americans do and will get their health care through
employer-provided insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or the Veterans'
Administration. 132
Second, state auto insurance mandates are enforced with a wide
range of penalties, including stiff fines and criminal punishment for those
who drive without insurance in some states.13 3 Penalties differ from state to
state but ten states punish first time offenders with jail time, while twenty
states impose a fine.134 Upon a second infraction, penalties can increase
130 See Payments of Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/I 13xx/doc 11379/individual
mandatepenalties-04-30.pdf (the majority of the uninsured population will not
be subject to the penalty; estimating about 4 million people will be subject to the
penalty); Linda J. Blumberg, Matthew Buettgens, & Judy Feder, The Individual
Mandate in Perspective, URBAN INST. 1-2 (Mar. 2012),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412533-the-individual-mandate.pdf.
131 Professor Mark Hall explains,
"[t]echnically, the mandate applies to all legal residents who
are not in prison and who do not claim a religious exemption,
but several categories of people are exempt from paying the
penalty for noncompliance. PPACA § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. §
5000A(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1A 2010). Exemptions include people
whose income is below the tax-filing threshold and people who
cannot afford coverage, which is defined as the lowest-priced
individual insurance plan costing them more than 8% of their
household income. Id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(1)-(2).
Exemptions also extend to members of Indian tribes, to
individuals with gaps in coverage of three months or fewer, and
to those suffering general hardship as defined by the Department
of Health and Human Services. Id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(3)-
(5)."
Hall, supra note 44, at 1830 n.20.
132 Blumberg, Buettgens, & Feder, supra note 130. 60% of Americans obtain
health insurance through their own or a family member's employer. ABRAHAM &
SCHWARCZ, supra note 29, at 4.
33 See infra notes 134-35.
134 Jail time for first time offenders: Alabama: ALA. CODE. § 32-7A-12 (2012)
(imposing not more than 3 months in jail); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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dramatically.13 The ACA, by contrast, as noted above, is enforceable only
by the limited Shared Responsibility Payment, generally "far less" than the
187.990 (West 2012) (imposing 90 days in jail); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 90, § 34J (West 2009) (imposing up to one year in jail); Minnesota:
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.791 (2003) (imposing 90 days in jail); New York: N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW. § 319 (McKinney 2003) (imposing a fine of $150-1,500, a
civil penalty fine of $750 and/or 15 days in jail); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §
7-606 (2011) (imposing up to 30 days in jail); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. §
56-9-80 (2011) (imposing up to 30 days in jail); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 32-35-113 (2012) (imposing a $500 fine or up to 30 days in jail); West
Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17D-2A-9 (2012) (imposing a $200-5,000 fine
and/or up to 15 days in jail); Wyoming: WYo. STAT. ANN. § 31-4-103 (West 2010)
(imposing a $250-700 fine and/or up to six months in jail). Fines for first time
offenders: See Alabama: ALA. CODE § 32-7A-16 (2000) (Class C Misdemeanor
resulting in a fine of not more than $500); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-
4135 (2009) (issuing a $500 fine); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1409
(West 2010) (issuing a fine of $500); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 §
2118(s)(1) (West 1995) (issuing a fine from $1,500-2,000); District of Columbia:
D.C. CODE § 31-2413(b)(1)(A) (2011) (issuing a civil fine of $500); Hawaii: HAW.
REV. STAT. § 431: 1OC- 117 (2006) (issuing a $500 fine); Illinois: 625 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/3-707 (West 2010) (issuing a $500-1000 fine); Iowa: IOWA CODE
ANN. § 321A.32 (West 1997) (issuing a $250-1,500 fine); Kentucky: KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 187.990 (West 2012) (issuing a $500 fine, 30 days imprisonment, or
both); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34J (West 2009) (issuing
a $500-5,000 fine and/or up to 1 year in prison); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §
169.791 (West 2011) (issuing a $200-1,000 fine); Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. §
63-15-4 (West 2010) (issuing a $500 fee); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3,168 (West 2005) (issuing a fine of $100-500); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
485.187 (West 2001) (issuing a fine of $600-1,000); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:6B-2 (West 2011) (issuing a $300-1,000 fine); New York: N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. § 319 (McKinney 2003) (issuing a $150-1,500 fine); South Dakota: S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 32-35-113 (2003) (issuing a $500 fine or thirty days
imprisonment); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 800 (West 2000) (issuing a
civil penalty of $250-500); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 17d-2a-7 (West 2011)
(issuing a $200-5,000 fine and/or up to 15 days imprisonment); Wisconsin: Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 344.65 (West 2009) (Issuing a $500 fine); Wyoming: WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 31-4-103 (West 2006) (issuing a $250-750 fine and/or 15 days
imprisonment).
135 For example, Arizona requires two-time offenders to pay $750 and forgo
their driving privileges for six months; a third violation increases the fine up to
$1,000. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4135 (2012). Arkansas imposes second
time offenders $250-500 and fines subsequent offenders $500-1,000 and/or
imposes a sentence of one year in jail. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-103 (West 2011).
Colorado and Utah penalize second-time offenders with a $1,000 fine. COLO. REV.
308
MANDATES, MARKETS, AND RISK
cost of insurance for those who can afford to buy but refuse to purchase
insurance. 136 There are no other penalties.13 7 The ACA individual mandate
is significantly less coercive than auto insurance mandates.
D. CONCLUSION
A common response to the example of car insurance mandates as
a relevant precedent, that driving is a choice so that auto insurance
mandates are irrelevant, falls apart under scrutiny. Driving is not a pure
choice, the ACA mandate creates a choice, and auto insurance mandates
actually are far more coercive than the ACA mandate. Dismantling the
"choice rejoinder" reinforces the point that auto insurance mandates are
relevant precedents for the ACA. The next section describes how today's
system of auto insurance mandates labored under strikingly similar
political and legal challenges for decades before becoming the well-settled
arrangement that it is today.
IV. THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF AUTO INSURANCE
MANDATES
This section traces the forgotten history of development of auto
insurance mandates, highlighting two aspects that are relevant to the ACA
STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1409 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-302 (West
2007). Idaho imposes a $1,000 fine and/or up to 6 months in jail. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 49-1232(2) (West 2012). The District of Columbia increases its initial civil
penalty of $500 by 50% for each additional offense, D.C. CODE § 31-
2413(b)(1)(A) (2011), while Hawaii fines two-time offenders three times as much
($1,500) for their second offense. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:1 OC- 117 (West 2006).
In Kansas, second-time offenders must pay $800-2,500, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3104(g)(2) (West 2010). Minnesotans, who for the second time violate their
compulsory auto insurance mandates, must pay up $3,000. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
169.791 (West 2011). New Jersey also imposes a stark punishment for repeat time
offenders; they must pay up to a $500 fine, spend up to 14 days in jail, and
complete thirty days of community service. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6B-2 (West
2011). Moreover, Wyoming imposes an even greater fine ($500-1,500) and
sentences these violators up to six months in jail. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 31-4-103
(2006).
136 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597 (2012).
As Justice Roberts stated, "[njeither the [ACA] nor any other law attaches
negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, beyond requiring a
payment to the IRS." Id.
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mandate.138 First is the complex legislative evolution of mandates which
showcases both the public-private nature of how U.S. society handles the
risks of automobiles and the contingent nature of arguments about freedom
in the context of insurance mandates. Second is the constitutional history
of auto insurance mandates; in this history, the public welfare dimensions
of insurance easily have trumped claims that mandates unconstitutionally
interfere with freedom.
A. THE COMPLEX LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF MANDATES
The spread of automobiles was an essential backdrop to the
development of auto insurance mandates. The rapid growth in the number
of vehicles on U.S. roads-the number of cars increased by ten times
between 1915 and 1930-led to huge changes in the U.S. 13 9 The very
welcome explosion in mobility went along with tremendous increases in
injuries in the first half of the twentieth century.140 Injuries were far more
common on a per-mile basis than they are now, and health and disability
insurance was far less common, so that injuries were likely to cause
disastrous financial consequences in addition to whatever physical and
emotional injuries they caused. 41 Legislative intervention was needed, and
various approaches were tried to deal with the problems caused by autos. 142
In 1927, Massachusetts became the first state to adopt a compulsory
liability insurance plan.143 Its major purpose was to ensure that defendants
138 Space limitations preclude a comprehensive history of the development of
auto insurance mandates. See generally LIABILrY, supra note 54, at 70-82; Jerry
& Richmond, supra note 26, § 131; Engstrom, supra note 89; Simon, supra note
27.
139 LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 70.
140 Simon, supra note 27, at 540.
141 LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 72-73.
142 Most states began by passing "financial responsibility" laws, which
required drivers involved in an accident caused by their negligence to show that
they had sufficient means to pay future claims. Connecticut passed the first such
law, in 1925, and 18 states passed similar laws by 1932. LIABILITY, supra note 54,
at 72. Many drivers satisfied these requirements by buying liability insurance. Id.
at 72. But these laws did not do anything to make sure that victims of a driver's
first negligently-caused accident would be compensated. Id. at 73.
143 See LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 73; WOODRUFF, FONSECA & SQUILLANTE,
supra note 71, § 3:21, at 90. The plan required drivers to show their ability to
cover damage caused by an accident in advance, unlike other states' financial
responsibility laws. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 72-73. The plan allowed drivers to
make a cash deposit in advance as an alternative, In re Opinion of the Justices, 147
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were solvent.'" The road to our nationwide web of auto insurance
mandates, which now includes high-risk plans in all states, liability
insurance in virtually all states, uninsured motorist coverage in twenty-two
states, and some combination of Med-Pay coverage, underinsured motorist
coverage, and no-fault elements in many states, was not smooth, quick, or
inevitable.
The auto insurance industry opposed insurance mandates for more
than six decades after the first-in-the-nation 1927 Massachusetts law took
effect.145 A major concern was that, although liability insurance mandates
obviously increase the demand for insurance, the mandates would force
companies to cover high risk drivers and reduce profitability.146 In
Massachusetts, the initial experience after compulsory liability insurance
passed was lowered profits, which stalled the momentum of those favoring
compulsory insurance and strengthened industry opposition.14 7 Industry
representatives used arguments based on freedom and American values to
oppose mandates.148
The opposition to mandates was articulated in terms of freedom
and free enterprise.149 For example, C.D. McVay, an insurance company
president, wrote in 1954 that mandates raised "the entire question of the
validity of private enterprise."' 50 He doubted the need for such mandates
when the number of deaths from auto accidents over a nine-year period
was less than the number of deaths from household accidents in Ohio over
the same period, and questioned the legislative priority accorded to auto
N.E. 681 (Mass. 1925), but is generally referred to as "compulsory liability
insurance legislation." LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 73.
4 JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, § 131, at 920.
145 LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 73. As Calvin Brainard wrote in his 1961
book, "[p]erhaps no other legislation has been so often proposed over so many
years and so strenuously opposed as that of compulsory auto insurance."
BRAINARD, supra note 71, at 428.
146 LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 74.
147 id.
148 See infra notes 149-153, 163, 165, and accompanying text.
149 See, e.g., C.D. McVay, The Case Against Compulsory Automobile
Insurance, 15 OHIO ST. L. J. 150, 154 (1954). Calvin Brainard reports in a 1961
book that a member of the Casualty Actuarial Society told a meeting of the
National Association of Casualty and Surety Executives: "The threat of
compulsory automobile insurance is not dead. The present danger in the situation
is that we may become weary of the battle and so let ourselves be beguiled into
believing that compulsory automobile insurance is not the evil which in our hearts
we know it to be." BRAINARD, supra note 71, at 435.
150 McVay, supra note 149, at 154.
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accident injuries: "[i]f we are going to set out a program of compensation
for loss from accident there is no logic or justification based on the social,
economic theory in not including any and all forms of accidental injury and
death.""' Coming as it did in 1954, and tying mandates to "social,
economic theory" and the elimination of private enterprise, he may have
been referring to the threat of socialism, although he does not say so
explicitly. 5 2 Regardless of whether he was referring to socialism, he is
saying that mandates directly threaten freedom and capitalism since they
may lead to creating an overly controlling and protective society where all
risks are insured. 3
After Massachusetts' pioneering 1927 law and the intervening
Depression, it was not until the 1950s that a second state, New York,
passed a mandatory liability insurance law.154 During the 1930s, a proposal
for a mandatory auto insurance plan modeled on workers compensation
with a no-fault theory of compensation was developed by an expert
commission.'" It was opposed by insurance companies and did not pass in
any state.1 16 Reform efforts in the 1970s to change from a negligence
system to a no-fault system stalled after initial successes and have not
fundamentally changed the system.1 7
1'5 Id.
152 Tellingly, Calvin Brainard wrote in 1954,"[C]ritics of universal financial
responsibility through statutory compulsion fear that it will 'lead to among other
things: administrative problems, more accidents, fraudulent claims, higher claims
costs, less insurance protection for the public, politics in rate making, the end of
the private insurance industry, and socialism." BRAINARD, supra note 71, at 435.
See also supra note 27.
153 Calvin Brainard quotes the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Robert B.
Anderson, as stating in 1959 that the strength of the American way of life is
grounded in "reliance on the integrity, wisdom and initiative of the individual-not
the directives of an all-wise government" in a speech to the annual convention of
the National Association of Life Underwriters. BRAINARD, supra note 71, at 206.
Brainard goes on to state "compulsory insurance programs are at odds to a greater
or less extent with this statement of principle wherever individuals have it within
their means to obtain minimum protection voluntarily." Id. at 206.
154 WIDIss & THOMAS, supra note 74, §1.10, at 9.
155 LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 74. This was known as "The Columbia Plan",
and was favored by many of those considered to be "the best minds" in the field.
Id. See generally Simon, supra note 27.
156 Economic problems such as the Depression eclipsed the importance of the
issue. LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 75-76.
15 7 See generally LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 75-76; Engstrom, supra note 89.
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In 1956, New York became the second state to pass a mandatory
liability insurance law; other states gradually followed New York's
example and by 1980, auto liability insurance was mandatory in most
states, despite continuing insurance company opposition.1 8
While opposing mandates, the insurance industry developed auto
insurance products such as uninsured motorist coverage to fill social needs,
cover risk privately, and stave off governmental control.'5 9 Such products
initially were optional but many states gradually mandated them.160 As
states developed legislation requiring drivers to have insurance, the
problem arose that many drivers were considered by insurance companies
to be too risky to insure. High-risk plans were gradually passed in every
state so that companies were mandated to cover a share of drivers they
thought were too risky to insure.' 6 ' These plans were at times proposed by
the insurance industry as a way to avoid government takeover of the risk,
and at times were opposed by insurance companies as a violation of their
158 See LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 82.
159 The invention of uninsured motorist coverage by insurance companies
exemplifies this dynamic. Uninsured motorist coverage requires drivers to buy
coverage to protect themselves against the risk that they will be injured by an
uninsured or hit-and-run motorist. WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 74, §1.2, at 2.
The problem of uncompensated auto injuries continued to be urgent and acute
after World War II, when auto use and auto accidents rapidly increased. Id.
Legislative pressure, especially in New York, increased for liability insurance
mandates. Insurance company opposition to liability insurance mandates and other
changes in insurance regulation remained firm. Id. §§ 1.8, 1.14, at 7, 14. Faced
with a stalemate, the New York Superintendent of Insurance asked insurance
companies for a solution that did not involve mandates, and the insurance industry
in response invented the idea of uninsured motorist coverage Id., § 1.8, at 8. The
coverage would protect the driver by putting the driver in the same position she
would have been in, had the motorist who caused her injury actually carried the
required insurance. Id. The coverage also would protect others who were
"insureds" on the policy, such as passengers. Id. Initially uninsured motorist
coverage was optional but gradually became mandatory in 21 states and the
District of Columbia. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Businesses v. Sibelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566, 2612 (2012). In the states where its purchase is not mandatory,
companies nonetheless are required to offer it even though they might prefer not
to. WIDIss & THOMAS, supra note 74, §§1.1, 1.11, 1.14, at 2, 10, 15 (noting that
uninsured motorist coverage is now the subject of mandates in 49 states; mandates
require either an uninsured motorist coverage in every policy or that such a policy
be offered to all insurance buyers).
16o WIDISS & THOMAS, supra note 74, § 1.9, at 8; ROBINETTE, supra note 74.
1 See supra note 112 (explaining how every state has a high risk plan).
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freedom of contract.16 2 Cars were so central that even risky drivers must
have the opportunity to buy insurance to drive, legislatures concluded.16 3
Insurance companies continued to oppose insurance mandates even
until the late 1980s.' Congress held hearings on auto insurance in 1988,
and at those hearings, a representative of the American Insurance
Association testified that the automobile insurance industry opposed
mandates "because we believe them fundamentally anathema to American
values." 65 The insurance association representative did not specify the
values to which he referred, but it seems likely that freedom of choice and
free enterprise would be among the values to which he was alluding. The
industry spokesman also blamed mandatory insurance for problems in the
insurance industry at that time and argued for repealing or reducing the
mandates.16 6
By 2011, auto insurance for drivers' liability was mandatory in all
but one jurisdiction, and states had a variety of other auto insurance
mandates.16 7 Private insurance companies have adjusted to the auto
insurance mandates, and there is now a thriving and very competitive
market for auto insurance in the United States.'68 This market continues to
innovate, as evidenced by the concept and technology of pay-as-you-
162 See Cal. State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105,
108 (1941). This constitutional challenge to California's high risk plan reached the
Supreme Court. See infra Part III.B.
163 In the development of assigned risk plans, we also see the universal
recognition that the auto insurance market, left to its own devices, will produce an
unacceptably high number of people considered uninsurable. See Cal. State Auto.
Ass'n. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 341 U.S. at 106-07.
16 See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer
Protection, and Competitiveness of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce H. of
Rep., 100th Cong. 325 (1988) (statement of David Snyder, Am. Ins. Ass'n).
165 Id. at 325.
166Snyder, representing the American Insurance Association, claimed "Auto
insurance problems result from legal requirements to buy automobile insurance,
unrealistically high mandatory coverages, skyrocketing losses resulting from
lawsuits, health care costs, crime and fraud, auto repair costs, preventable deaths
and injuries on our highways, and counter-productive regulatory intervention into
the private sector." Id. at 323. He argued for the repeal or reduction of mandatory
insurance and financial responsibility requirements. Id. at 324.
167 See supra Part I.C. Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, INS. INFO. INST.
(Feb. 2013), http://www.iii.org/issuesupdates/compulsory-auto-uninsured-
motorists.html.
16 See supra note 91.
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drive.16 9 Insurance companies have long urged more federal governmental
efforts to promote safety,170 and also have independent safety promotion
programs. 171 Price competition for customers is fierce, particularly with
the advent of internet commerce. 17 2 Driving has become an essential part of
U.S. life, the U.S. economy, and how millions of Americans get to work,
school, medical care, and shopping. Although often overlooked, auto
insurance mandates are an important part of this picture.1 73 Now the
Insurance Information Institute, an influential national industry group,
states that "[t]he public generally supports compulsory insurance and
wants these laws enforced." 17 4 Auto insurance laws exemplify how
government mandates coupled with private competition have resulted in a
successful system which extends coverage and shares risk very broadly,
bringing many benefits to consumers. 175
The twentieth-century freedom and free enterprise arguments
against auto insurance mandates are no longer made by the insurance
169 Progressive Insurance Company, for example, has a program known as
Snapshot, which promises to save good drivers up to 30% with use of a device that
is plugged into drivers' cars and transmits information such as how and when one
drives which is used to revise drivers' rates on a monthly basis. See How Snapshot
Works, PROGESSIVE.COM, www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot-how-it-works.aspx
(last visited Feb. 27, 2013). See generally Wriggins, supra note 65 (detailing pay-
as-you-drive auto insurance innovations and arguing such insurance would reduce
driving). Insurance companies have developed partnerships with private
environmental groups such as the Hartford's partnership with the Sierra Club,
through which Hartford offers lower rates on hybrid vehicles. Matthew
Sturdevant, The Hartford Announces New Affiliation With Sierra Club,
COURANT.COM (June 2, 2011, 2:13 PM) http://blogs.courant.com/connecticut
insurance/2011/06/the-hartford-announces-new-aff.html.
170 See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer
Protection, and Competitiveness of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce H. of
Rep., supra note 164, at 324.
171 Allstate Insurance Company and the affiliated Allstate Foundation have
made research on teens and risk, and teen driver safety, a priority. See, e.g.,
Chronic, A Report on the State of Teen Driving 2005 (Allstate Found.,
Northbrook, IL), 2005, available at http://www.allstate.com/content/refresh-
attachments/citizenship/chronic.pdf.
172 See supra note 91.
173 See LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 101-103; DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note
65, at 219.
174 INS. INFO. INST., supra note 167.
175 See supra notes 167-173 and accompanying text.
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industry and seem to have very little traction for most people today. As
insurance expert Kenneth Abraham observes:
For most people, paying sizable sums for auto
insurance has simply become part of the background
cost of living. The whole insurance and liability
system for dealing with auto accidents has become so
embedded in our lives that it is almost transparent.176
While most people probably do not think about auto insurance mandates
much, and do not seem to understand the specifics of mandates well,177
there is a broad recognition on the part of both insurance companies and
people that auto insurance mandates are one of the ways we deal as a
society with the risks of driving. 78
B. QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The legality of the various kinds of auto insurance mandates is
now well-established. However, when they passed their constitutionality
was doubted and at times challenged. Decisions generally upheld them.179
The court decisions that, almost without exception, upheld them over the
last 87 years showcase the public welfare function of insurance.
Prior to passing its pioneering 1927 auto insurance mandate, the
Massachusetts legislature asked for an Advisory Opinion from the
Supreme Judicial Court of that state on twenty-nine questions concerning
its constitutionality. 80 The Supreme Judicial Court pronounced the law
constitutional.' 81 The Court found that the dangers posed by cars presented
ample reason for requiring drivers to prove that they could cover tort
judgments, since "legal liability without financial responsibility is a barren
right to one who sustains injury by the wrongful act of another."'18 2 The
176 LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 102.
177 See supra note 12.78 See INS. INFO. INST., supra note 167.
1 See infra note 206.
180o n re Op. of the Justices, 147 N.E. 681 (Mass. 1925). The legislature asked
ten questions, several of which had many subsections, leading to a total of 29. The
questions ranged from whether the law's requirements for operators were
constitutional to whether the regulation of policies (such as not allowing
termination during the term of the policy) were constitutional. Id. at 684-686.
181 See id. at 693.
182Id. at 694.
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court stressed the "peculiar nature" of insurance, which subjects it to broad
government regulation since it "affects large numbers of people and is
intimately connected with the public welfare."'13 The court noted that
compulsory workers compensation insurance had been upheld against due
process challenges, and opined that workers compensation mandates were
"a greater stretch of legislative power than is contemplated by the proposed
bill."l84 The court upheld rules against cancellations and limitations on
underwriting in the legislation, noting that the law's interference with
companies' "freedom of contract" and its interference with drivers'
"freedom of action" were both justified.'8 5 Judicial review of insurance
company decisions was necessary because the refusal to issue a policy
"may drive one out of business or seriously hamper his convenience."
As a result of that 1925 opinion, the law's constitutionality has rarely been
challenged; the thorough Massachusetts opinion set the stage for
acceptance of other states' mandates. 87
In 1933, the U.S. Supreme Court faced the question of whether the
compulsory auto liability insurance law in Massachusetts violated an
individual's fourteenth amendment rights. 88  Mr. Joseph Poresky, pro se,
claimed that "he cannot comply with the statute" although he did not say
why, and asserted that the statute violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 89 He sought a writ of mandamus forcing the federal court in
Massachusetts to hear his application for an injunction, but the Supreme
Court simply denied the petition, citing the 1925 Massachusetts Advisory
1831d. at 698.
18 Id. at 696. Workers compensation legislation began to be passed in the
United States in the early twentieth century. Laws were broadly modeled on
Britain's and Germany's laws which were passed in the late nineteenth century. 1
LARSON, supra note 84 at §2.06 at 2-10. See generally SKOCPOL, supra note 27, at
285-302; WITT, supra note 84. Constitutional challenges were filed to workers
compensation statutes but they were ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). See supra note 84.
185 See In re Op. of the Justices, 147 N.E. at 701.
18 id.
187 WOODRUFF, FONSECA & SQUILLANTE, supra note 71, §3:29, at 95.
188 Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, reh'g. denied, 366 U.S. 922 (1933).
Although the decision does not specifically mention due process, it has been
referred to as pertaining to due process rights. WOODRUFF, FONSECA &
SQUILLANTE, supra note 71, §3:29, at 95.
18 Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, reh'g. denied, 366 U.S. 922 (1933).
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Opinion of the Justices and other cases supporting government's authority
to enact laws in the interest of the public safety and welfare. 190
The most high-profile constitutional challenge was to California's
high-risk plan; California State Auto Association Inter-Insurance Bureau
v. Maloney was decided in 1951 by the United States Supreme Court.191
The context was that as states gradually passed requirements that drivers
have insurance or show that they could pay for harm they caused by some
other means, many drivers were considered "high risk" by insurance
companies who refused to insure them. 192 States then began passing laws
requiring insurance companies to cover a share of high-risk drivers starting
in 1938; these plans often are known as assigned risk plans. 19 3 A California
insurance organizationl94 challenged the constitutionality of that state's
assigned risk plan, passed in 1947, claiming that the law interfered with its
due process rights by requiring it to contract with people it did not want to
contract with, thereby making it less profitable. 195 The challenge resulted in
190 Id.
191 See Cal. State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 107
(1951).
192 See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
193JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26 at §22[e]. Every state has such a plan.
See supra note 112. New Hampshire enacted the first assigned risk plan in 1938.
Snyder, supra note 54, at 324. New Hampshire had passed a law in 1937 requiring
motorists to deposit security or purchase insurance in a sufficient amount to pay
for a lawsuit stemming from a car accident. This type of law is known as a
'financial security law'. See LIABILTY supra note 54, at 72. These types of laws
were precursors to the current mandatory liability laws; most drivers complied
with these laws by purchasing auto liability insurance. Id. at 72-73. Many people
were unable to deposit the necessary security because they did not have the funds,
and were unable to obtain insurance because they were considered too risky for
insurers. Id. Hence the structure was created where insurers were assigned
policyholders they simply were required to cover. Id.
'9 The opinion describes the organization, California State Automobile
Association Inter-Insurance Bureau, as follows:
Appellant is an unincorporated association which the California
District Court of Appeal analogizes to a mutual insurance corporation.
The details of its organization and operation are not important here. It is
supervised by the Insurance Commissioner of California, like other
insurance companies doing a liability insurance business. It was formed
to write automobile insurance to a select group of members at a lower
cost than the then prevailing rate.
341 U.S. at 106.
9 Id. at 107.
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a unanimous 1951 United States Supreme Court opinion that explained the
history of assigned risk plans and upheld the California plan.' 96 The
mandate was on insurers rather than drivers so it is distinguishable. But the
case is significant here for several reasons. First, the mandate on
companies relates directly to individual mandates since it arose from and
was necessitated by these mandates. The case also highlights the
deferential treatment given to insurance laws in light of the strong links
between insurance, the public welfare, and government regulation, shows
how driving has long been a necessity; and illustrates the public-private
nature of legislative solutions to thorny public policy problems.
Justice Douglas, writing for the court, first described the California
law which required that all drivers show proof of financial responsibility
before they could get a driver's license.19 7 Justice Douglas stated that the
law made it impossible for many people to drive since they were classified
as poor risks, rightly or wrongly, by insurance companies and did not have
the funds to show proof of financial responsibility with cash as the law
allowed.'98 Douglas noted that "many hardship cases developed among
people who were dependent upon the use of the highways for a living." 99
One proposed solution was that the state itself would insure these risks.200
Instead, insurance companies responded with legislation, which the
legislature passed, authorizing the Insurance Commissioner to establish a
plan for each company to insure some of the drivers who could not obtain
insurance in the regular market. 20 1 The resulting plan assigned higher risk
drivers to companies in proportion to their market share.202
196 Id. at 105.
19 Id. at 106. Justice Black believed it was frivolous to suggest there was a
constitutional question. Id. at 111 ("Mr. Justice Black would dismiss the appeal on
the ground that the constitutional questions are frivolous."). At the time of the
Maloney case, California did not have mandatory liability insurance for drivers;
Massachusetts was still the only state with mandatory liability insurance. See
supra text accompanying note 158.
198 Maloney, 341 U.S. at 107. The lower court noted concerns that insurance
companies' risk classification was inaccurate towards racial minorities, as well as
the elderly and young drivers, and caused "much hardship and many inequities."
Cal. State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Downey, 216 P.2d 882 (Cal. App. 1st
Dist.)(1950), af'd, Cal. State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S.
105, 107 (1951).
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The Supreme Court, noting that the state could have taken over the
whole field, and that insurance was "a business to which the government
has long had a special relation," upheld the plan as permissible regulation
of a challenging problem.203 Notable was the court's recognition of the
centrality of automobiles, even in 1951, to many people's livelihoods, and
the hardship of not being able to drive .2  Also striking was the fact that
"the economic burden on the public purse" caused by uncompensated
injuries was a reason offered for the mandate.205 Finally, it is noteworthy
that high risk plans were developed by private industry in response to the
threat of government takeover of insuring for that risk.206
State auto insurance mandates of all types have been upheld for
decades against constitutional attacks; the "public welfare" nature of
insurance, the "special relation" between government and insurance, and
the "peculiar nature" of insurance all were factors supporting courts'
207acceptance. Legal challenges based on freedom, like the policy
203 Maloney, 341 U.S. at 109. Justice Douglas wrote that "[c]learing the
highways of irresponsible drivers, devising ways and means for making sure that
compensation is awarded the innocent victims, and yet managing a scheme which
leaves the highways open for the deserving are problems that have taxed the
ingenuity of lawmakers and administrators." Id. at 110.204 See Maloney, 341 U.S. at 107, 110.
205 Brief for Appellee at 37 n. 23, Cal. State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v.
Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951) (No. 310).
206 Maloney, 341 U.S. at 107. The same is true for uninsured motorist
coverage, which was also developed to avoid government takeover of the risk. See
supra note 157.
207 Maloney, 341 U.S. at 110, In re Op. of the Justices, 147 N.E. at 698. Cases
and advisory opinions deeming auto insurance mandates constitutional include the
following: Drake v. Gordon, 848 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1988). Bushnell v. Sapp, 571
P.2d 1100 (Colo. 1977); Gentile v. Altermatt, 363 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1975); Del Rio v.
Crake, 955 P.2d 90 (Haw. 1998); Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins., Co., 708
P.2d 129 (Haw. 1985); Burriss v. N. Assurance Co. of Am., 691 P.2d 10 (Kan.
1984), Manzanares v. Bell, 522 P.2d 1291 (Kan. 1974); Fann v. McGuffey, 534
S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975); Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971); In re
Opinion of Justices, 147 N.E. 681 (Mass. 1925); In re Requests of the Governor
and the Senate on the Constitutionality of Act No. 294 of the Public Acts of 1972,
208 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. 1973); Justices, 129 A. 117 (N.H. 1925); Rybeck v.
Rybeck, 358 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Montgomery v. Daniels,
340 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971); Singer v. Sheppard, 346 A.2d 897 (Pa.
1975); For a comprehensive although dated list of challenges to auto insurance
mandates by state see IRVIN E. SHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 11
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, Vol I 1981). See also Josephine Y. King,
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arguments based on freedom that were made to oppose the laws' passage,
have been abandoned. Opponents now use the political process to lobby for
changes they seek.208 The system of auto insurance mandates and private
competition has been with us for decades; with constitutional doubts laid to
rest and legislative support for the mandates, industry and individuals have
adjusted to the very American public-private model of dealing with the
consequences of automobile accidents.2
V. CONCLUSION
Now that the Supreme Court has upheld the ACA's individual
mandate under the Federal government's taxing power, it is a critical time
to look at precedents for the individual mandate, which was not done at the
time of the ACA's passage or the Supreme Court case. A systematic
examination of auto insurance mandates shows that the ACA individual
mandate is not the uniquely coercive anomaly that its opponents claim.
Auto insurance mandates are similar in four important, yet
unexamined ways, to the ACA individual mandate. First, both types of
mandate are responses to difficult situations that defy simple solutions;
there are strong public policy reasons for both types of mandates.
Second, both order people to buy insurance to protect themselves
from risks they might want to bear themselves. Third, both require that
risks be pooled and spread, which is fundamentally what insurance is and
does. Fourth, both mandate that some people buy something from a private
Constitutionality of No Fault Jurisprudence, 1982 UTAH L. REv. 797 (1982);
BERNARD P. BELL, 5-46 NEW APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 46.03
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2011). But see Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So.2d
9 (Fla. 1973)(holding that the threshold classifications of the compulsory
insurance law were arbitrary); Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474 (111. 1972)
(Illinois' no- fault law unconstitutionally discriminated against commercial
vehicles by limiting their special damages remedies and that the compulsory
arbitration provision denied citizens their right to a jury trial); Shavers v. Kelley, -
267 N.W. 2d 72 (Mich. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979)(Michigan no-
fault law's procedures for rate-setting do not guarantee due process; eighteen
months granted for the state to develop a remedy).
208 People and organizations can and do lobby their representatives to change
auto insurance laws if they object to them, as happened in 2011 in Wisconsin.
Jason Stein, Walker Signs Bill Rolling Back Auto Insurance Minimums,
MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN JOURNAL-SENTINEL ONLINE, (Apr. 12, 2011), available
at ww.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/1 19695019.html.
209 LIABILITY, supra note 54, at 102-04.
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seller; they both use a model of a regulated market combined with private
competition to deal with the problems at which they are aimed rather than
have a government program handle the problems. Most broadly, they
embody essentially the same policy response to a massive public policy
problem involving illness or injury and how to pay for needed treatment or
redress.
The most common response to the parallel is that auto insurance
mandates are distinguishable and actually irrelevant because they are
regulating something that is a choice-whereas the ACA mandate coercively
intrudes on individuals' freedom. This "choice rejoinder" resonates with
the sentiments underlying the majority's Commerce Clause discussion, but
this Article has shown that it falls apart under scrutiny for three reasons.
First, driving is not always a choice, and both caselaw and insurance laws
recognize this. The fact that every state has laws requiring insurance
companies to insure high-risk drivers shows that driving is seen as a
necessity rather than a choice, for example. Second, the Supreme Court's
decision makes clear that the ACA individual mandate presents a choice
between buying insurance and paying higher taxes, so it is not coercive in
the way opponents claim. Third, car insurance mandates are far more
coercive than the ACA mandate in their reach and enforcement
mechanisms.
The history of auto insurance mandates, both legislative and
constitutional, yields several observations that bear on the ACA. One,
arguments about freedom and American values are recycled from
generation to generation by reform opponents but do not necessarily have
staying power. The current "forced purchase of broccoli" 210 arguments
made by mandate opponents and accepted by the majority opinion in the
Commerce Clause section may fade over time as the ACA goes into effect.
Second, the combination of auto insurance market regulation, including
high risk plans that mandate expansion of coverage, with private auto
insurance mandates, has been so workable that it is rarely the focus of
public attention. The ACA's individual mandate and other reforms
similarly recognize that market intervention is necessary to expand
coverage more widely, and envision a system significantly similar to our
auto insurance system where insurance companies compete in a regulated
market. Third, while constitutional doubts initially were raised about
mandates, these doubts have been definitively resolved in part because of
what the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court called the "peculiar
2l0 See NFIB v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591.
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nature" of insurance and its significance for the "public welfare" 2 1 1 and
what the United States Supreme Court called the "special relation"
between government and the insurance business.212 Health insurance has a
public welfare function that is far more important than car insurance, so if
decisions upholding car insurance showcase the public welfare function of
insurance, how much more should the public welfare function of insurance
be emphasized in the context of health insurance.
This article has demystified the ACA individual mandate by
showing its significant similarities to the commonplace, widely accepted
auto insurance mandates found all over the United States. Now that the
ACA individual mandate has been shown to be grounded in the U.S. public
policy tradition of auto insurance mandates, perhaps the focus can shift to
making it work as well as possible.
211 See In re Op. of the Justices, 147 N.E. at 701.
212 Maloney, 341 U.S. at 105.
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